When the Franco-German Brigade (FGB) was established in 1989, it was hailed as a unique experiment in postwar Europe. Never before had soldiers from two former enemies served permanently under a shared command structure in times of peace. More than three decades later, the Brigade remains a symbol of European integration—but also an exposing example of its practical and political limitations. It reflects both the aspirations for a shared European security culture and the structural challenges that continuously challenge it

From Political Signal to Military Institution
The summit meeting between US President Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, held in Reykjavik from 10 to 12 October 1986, ended without any significant results. On the other hand, for the first time at a summit conference there was debate about real disarmament of intercontinental and medium-range missiles. These discussions caused considerable unease in government circles in Paris and Bonn. They saw the foundations of European security as threatened; in their eyes both nuclear deterrence and American support in Europe were being called into question. Helmut Kohl therefore asked his French counterpart François Mitterrand for an alternative security arrangement.

At a summit meeting in Karlsruhe on 13 November 1987, President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl agreed to establish a joint Franco-German military unit. As early as 19 June, the two statesmen had proposed setting up a ‘fully integrated’ military unit in the form of a ‘brigade’. This was described as an ‘embryo’ that would both serve European defence and act as a focal point for a Franco-German security partnership.

Its motto—”Committed to Excellence / Devoir d’excellence“—was meant to signal a pioneering spirit. Yet even as the unit was formally inaugurated in 1990, the underlying tensions between symbolic ambition and institutional reality were already becoming apparent.

Deployment Practice: Integrated on Paper, Divided in the Field
The FGB has participated in numerous international missions, including operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Mali. While such involvement demonstrates political commitment, a closer look reveals that any actual joint deployment has remained an exception. Most operations were conducted in parallel, with German and French contingents operating in the same theatre but under separate command structures and national mandates.

Only two deployments stand out for their structurally integrated character: In 1997, elements of the FGB formed the core of the German contingent within the “Multinational Brigade Centre” in Rajlovac (Bosnia), providing the brigade staff and contributing to a binational command framework. In 2004, approximately 1,000 German and French soldiers were deployed as part of the Kabul Multinational Brigade under the International Security Assistance Force, representing a rare instance of coordinated binational force contribution at an operational level. Yet even in these cases, cohesion proved fragile. After a single contingent in Afghanistan, French and German forces went their separate ways, with France moving to the east and Germany to the north. In other locations, such as Kosovo and Mali, operational cooperation was even more limited. Former Brigade commander Walter Spindler recalled that, in Kosovo, separate planning was intentional from the beginning: “We planned side by side, not together.”

The reasons for this lie not in a lack of willingness, but rather in the significant differences in strategic culture. France tends to act more autonomously and with more robust mandates; Germany operates under tighter political and legal constraints, most notably the Parliamentary Participation Act (Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz), which requires Bundestag approval for all deployments. These structural asymmetries make any coordinated action difficult, both politically and operationally.

Everyday Integration: Between Cooperation and Parallelism
The difficulties of integration extend into the daily life of the Brigade. Differences in training systems, career paths, disciplinary frameworks and institutional norms have created an environment where German and French troops often serve alongside, but not truly with one another. This coexistence is shaped more by parallel routines, rather than shared practices.

Language is a case in point. For much of its early history, the Brigade functioned bilingually, using German and French in separate staff channels. Only through its increasing integration into larger multinational frameworks – particularly the Eurocorps – did English gradually become the working language. But linguistic convergence has not guaranteed cultural or operational alignment. While there are binational posts, joint exercises, and symbolic gestures of unity (such as mixed parades or shared ceremonies), these often remain superficial. A common identity has only developed in isolated cases, typically depending on the leadership style and commitment of individual officers. Cross-national cohesion, where it exists, tends to emerge organically through deployment experience rather than top-down institutional design.

Strategic Ambiguity: Competing National Visions
The Brigade’s uncertain operational status reflects divergent national expectations. France has long regarded the FGB as an instrument of strategic utility – a potential operational force within a European defence context. Germany, conversely, has traditionally emphasised its role in training, partnership, and diplomacy. This contrast was highlighted again in January 2025, when both countries agreed to place the Brigade under NATO’s Multinational Corps Northeast in Szczecin for a three-year period. In the French version of the joint declaration, the Brigade was described as combat-ready; in the German version, the focus was on training and interoperability. These differing visions were nothing new – they trace back to the Brigade’s founding and reflect long-standing differences in military culture. Shaped by their respective post–World War II trajectories, France maintained a globally deployable force with a tradition of strategic autonomy, while Germany developed a territorially oriented army embedded in multilateral structures and subject to strict parliamentary control.

This discursive divergence underscores a deeper issue: the lack of a shared political vision for the Brigade’s future. While officers and soldiers have repeatedly expressed their readiness to operate together, they are often constrained by differing national mandates, slow political processes, and bureaucratic inertia. Despite its high-level visibility, the Brigade lacks the strategic clarity it needs to transcend its symbolic formation.

Strategic Drift in Times of Strategic Demand
The question of the Brigade’s future becomes more pressing in light of Europe’s evolving security environment. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, ongoing instability in the Sahel, and the possibility of U.S. retrenchment from Europe have all placed renewed emphasis on European defence autonomy. In this context, the FGB could serve as a prototype for deeper cooperation.

However, to fulfil such a role, structural reforms are desperately needed. Legal frameworks must be aligned, operational doctrines harmonised, and leadership structures integrated. Even more than that must both Paris and Berlin commit to a shared understanding of what the Brigade is truly meant for: a symbolic demonstration or real operational capacity?

The Franco-German Brigade symbolizes how far European defence has come—and how far it still has to go. It was born of political will, but without sustained backing, structural alignment, and a shared institutional culture, it risks remaining a gesture. Its success will depend less on military readiness than on political resolve to turn unity from rhetoric into reality.

Benjamin Pfannes, M.A., studied Modern and Contemporary History in Mainz and Dijon. During his studies, he worked as a research assistant for the Chair of Contemporary History as well as the Leibniz Institute for European History. The core of his research mainly consists of German and French history during the twentieth century, with a focus on national socialism. He is currently writing a dissertation at the University of Potsdam in which he examines the role of the Franco-German Brigade in binational cooperation between Germany and France

New Voices offers a space for postgraduate students and early-career researchers working on post-1914 European history to publish short public-facing articles about their ongoing original research. To submit an idea or for more information, please email cehnewvoices@gmail.com