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  3. A Theory of Efficient Cooperation and Competition
  • Cited by 39
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    • Publisher:
      Cambridge University Press
      Publication date:
      November 2009
      September 1987
      ISBN:
      9780511528378
      9780521306195
      9780521022200
      DOI:
      https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511528378
      Dimensions:
      (228 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.6kg, 320 Pages
      Dimensions:
      (228 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.47kg, 320 Pages
      • Subjects:
      Economics, Industrial Economics, Microeconomics
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    • Selected: Digital
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    Subjects:
    Economics, Industrial Economics, Microeconomics
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    Book description

    This 1987 book looks at competition, attacking the notion that competition always leads to good results and that more competition is better. It also attacks the notion that cooperation is always harmful. An efficient economic equilibrium requires an optimal combination of both cooperation and rivalry. Telser first examines the genesis of certain late nineteenth-century laws that affected competition in the United States. Going on to give theoretical insights into cooperation and rivalry, he shows when unrestricted competition can lead to an efficient equilibrium, as well as when restrictions on competition can provide for the same. The tensions between these two forces are especially pertinent to the study of innovation - the more costly it is to protect the property rights of ideas, the greater is the reliance on secrecy, and hence, the more likely is the wasteful duplication of results.

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