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15 - Kargil, deterrence, and international relations theory

from Part 3 - Lessons learned

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 March 2010

Peter R. Lavoy
Affiliation:
National Intelligence Council
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Summary

Introduction

The challenger faces a much stronger adversary and is frustrated by its inability to protect itself and change the status quo. Blocked from advancing its cause and enraged by the adversary's hostile if not aggressive actions, it hits upon a clever if desperate move. The adversary's superiority makes it overconfident and the challenger proceeds in secret, disguises its actions, and does what is believed to be unlikely, thus enabling it to put its forces in position without being discovered. By taking actions that bear some resemblance to what the adversary has done, the challenger gives itself added legitimacy. Nevertheless, when the adversary discovers what is happening it reacts very strongly, and the rest of the world sides with it. After an exchange of nuclear threats and conventional maneuvering, the challenger is forced to withdraw, humiliated and with little to show for it. One result is that the challenger's leader is overthrown. The world has come uncomfortably close to a nuclear exchange, but years later we still debate the motives on each side, the nature of the interaction, the relative importance of conventional and nuclear arms, the actions of third parties, the role of intelligence, and whether a better diplomacy could have diffused the crisis.

Type
Chapter
Information
Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia
The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict
, pp. 377 - 397
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2009

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