As John Hart notes, “The Brownlow Report, the Reorganization Act, Reorganization Plan No. 1, and E.O. 8248 together were a watershed in the history of presidential staffing.” They mark the first significant institutionalization of presidentially controlled sources of bargaining support. Roosevelt's belief that, in the oft-quoted phrase from his introduction to the Brownlow Report, “the president needs help” provided the impetus for staff reform. But the details of reform, as first laid out in that Report, were dictated by his specific bargaining needs, particularly information and expertise regarding policy planning, budgeting and fiscal affairs, personnel selection, administrative management, and economic regulation.

In modernizing the presidential office, however, Roosevelt conspicuously avoided planting the seed of the presidential branch; the acquisition of additional White House staff was but a small part in his otherwise ambitious plan to reorganize the presidency. As he explained to Senator James Byrnes, who led the floor fight for legislation to implement the Brownlow Report on FDR's behalf: “[A]s a matter of fact, I would hardly know what to do with six Executive [White House] Assistants if I do not have any authority to put the government as a whole on a businesslike basis. It is a little like giving the President the envelope of the letter without any letter in it!”

As the blueprint for FDR's staff reforms, the Brownlow Report is in many respects the most thoroughly articulated synopsis of his response to escalating demands for presidential leadership.? Congress, however, viewed the recommendations with suspicion, particularly the sections dealing with civil service reform, executive branch reorganization, and the duties of the Comptroller-General's Office.