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2 - A Theory of Aggregation Incentives

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 July 2009

Allen Hicken
Affiliation:
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
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Summary

INTRODUCTION

Imagine you are a political entrepreneur seeking political power in pursuit of some goal. This could include everything from pursuing personal enrichment, to protecting or advancing the interests of a certain group, to implementing your preferred set of programmatic policies. As discussed in the last chapter, there are many reasons why, in a modern democracy, a political party would most likely be your vehicle for seeking political power in pursuit of that goal. But what factors dictate the kind of party you choose to join or organize? Specifically, when would you want to join or form a large, national party, and when might you be content with belonging to a smaller organization? These are the questions I seek to answer in this chapter.

To answer these questions, I focus on the incentives of two types of actors – first, political entrepreneurs or nascent party leaders, and second, candidates for the national legislature. Political entrepreneurs can come of in a variety of types – they might be the leader of the political group or faction, the leader of a small or medium-sized political party, or a notable figure looking to enter politics. The distinguishing feature of these entrepreneurs is their goal to capture some share of national executive authority via their position as head of a political party.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2009

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  • A Theory of Aggregation Incentives
  • Allen Hicken, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
  • Book: Building Party Systems in Developing Democracies
  • Online publication: 29 July 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511575563.003
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  • A Theory of Aggregation Incentives
  • Allen Hicken, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
  • Book: Building Party Systems in Developing Democracies
  • Online publication: 29 July 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511575563.003
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

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  • A Theory of Aggregation Incentives
  • Allen Hicken, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
  • Book: Building Party Systems in Developing Democracies
  • Online publication: 29 July 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511575563.003
Available formats
×