introduction

The doctrine of Neutral Monism was an avowed part of Russell's metaphysics for only a relatively short period in his amazingly long philosophical career, although it remained an active ingredient for considerably longer. His acceptance of this doctrine was gradual. To a lecture audience in early 1918, when he was in his mid-forties, he declared: “I feel more and more inclined to think that [Neutral Monism] may be true. I feel more and more that the difficulties that occur in regard to it are all of the sort that may be solved by ingenuity” [PLA Papers 8, p. 242]. Shortly afterwards, Russell gave a partial endorsement of the doctrine and then, during the next decade, in major works like The Analysis of Mind, An Outline of Philosophy and The Analysis of Matter, he set about to deepen and refine that endorsement. For more than two decades thereafter, the metaphysical imprint of Neutral Monism remained evident in Russell's major philosophical writings (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, Human Knowledge), though he no longer marshalled his views explicitly under its banner. Neutral Monism constitutes, therefore, a major part of Russell's philosophy outside the area of formal logic. Indeed, the doctrine plays a kind of antipodal role in the whole development of his thought, for prior to taking the first steps towards accepting Neutral Monism, Russell had been its most severe critic.

formative themes

To see why Russell regarded Neutral Monism as an important doctrine even when he was its staunch opponent, it is necessary to recall some of the ideals and values which shaped his philosophical outlook from nearly the start of his career and which continued to be active, though in different proportions and with changing interpretations, to the end.