Chapter 3 demonstrates that MDDs are related to higher levels of democracy. This does not mean, however, that some dictatorships do not resort to TD-MDDs again and again. Actually, insights from the historical account on the use of MDDs show that it is plausible that their use in some autocracies plays an important role in contemporary politics. Some dictators have systematically resorted to plebiscites for advancing their political interest, demonstrated in the cases of Ceauşescu, Lukashenko, “Baby Doc,” and Marcos. Yet not all autocrats resort to MDDs, as we see with the regimes of Hu Jintao, Somoza, Pol Pot, and Suharto. In different degrees and with different purposes, MDDs are political instruments used in any type of regime. This chapter highlights the importance of who controls the agenda in determining whether MDDs reinforce or undermine democracy.

Under nondemocratic systems, it is almost impossible to think about popular initiatives or referendums in the manner we have thus far (through sincere and clean signature gathering); instead, we would expect only top-down proposals. The dynamics of the political game are definitely different in an authoritarian regime (not to mention totalitarian) than those found in democracies. The underlying logic is that democracies allow their citizens to freely organize, mobilize, and press the government for changes (or the maintenance of the status quo). In democracies, citizens are more likely to influence, denounce, and punish their governments for their shortcomings, and the government's tenure depends on electoral politics.