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12 - Empathy and Reciprocating Attitudes

from V - Empathy and Morality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 December 2017

By
Stephen Darwall
Edited by
Neil Roughley  and
Thomas Schramme
Neil Roughley
Affiliation:
Universität Duisburg–Essen
Thomas Schramme
Affiliation:
University of Liverpool
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Forms of Fellow Feeling
Empathy, Sympathy, Concern and Moral Agency
 , pp. 292 - 306
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2018

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References

Bibligraphy

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