Dictatorships often face problems with policy implementation, monitoring local officials to prevent theft and abuse of office, and gathering information from the grassroots. Leaders expect local officials to implement policies and report information about local problems, how policies work on the ground, and signs of opposition to central authorities. Often, however, regime elites lack the capacity to monitor the behavior of local officials, who may relay distorted information because they fear being blamed for bad news. Elections can partially compensate for regime leaders’ limited ability to monitor their local agents. Bad election outcomes serve as “fire alarms” to alert leaders to especially incompetent, abusive, or corrupt local officials. Elections thus help protect dictatorships by providing periodic monitoring of lower-level officials. The expectation of facing future elections also gives officials and deputies reasons to report information about problems and discontent to central leaders, lobby for resources for their regions, and distribute some of the benefits they acquire to local people. In these ways, parties and elections help the dictatorship located in the capitol to extend its policies and governance to all parts of the country.