The goal of Chapter 5 is to respond to a long-standing objection to the PDE known as the closeness problem. The problem is supposed to arise because intentions are sufficiently fine-grained that an agent need not intend harm in nearly any situation. The PDE therefore fails to rule out conduct that is intuitively objectionable in a host of cases unless it is supplemented with a criterion of excessive closeness, whose role is to identify things that are “too close” to harm to be considered incidental for purposes of double effect. However, it also proves extremely difficult to specify a criterion of closeness that is not arbitrary or subject to counterexamples. The closeness problem is often thought to be particularly acute for Anscombe-style accounts of intentional action, such as the one I presented in Chapter 4. I argue, however, that the magnitude of the closeness problem has been exaggerated and that the PDE does not need to be supplemented by a criterion of closeness.