This chapter has three main sections. After first introducing the concept of doxa, the second section considers it as part of Bourdieu's theory of practice. Here, I address its significance in the way fields operate, crucially in the relationships between field structures and habitus. I show how Bourdieu's approach to doxa differs significantly from others and the implications that follow on from his own working of the concept. There are examples of the way doxa functions in a range of Bourdieu's empirical studies – in education, culture and economics, etc. These examples extend to knowledge or academic field, which is the focus, in conclusion, for the third section of the chapter. Here, we consider the extent to which doxa rules in intellectual fields and what needs to take place in order to break free from it. Finally, I conclude with some reflections on what might be the outcome of such an undertaking.

Introduction

Following on from Durkheim's understanding, Bourdieu considered that the sociology of culture was the sociology of religion of our time. The early adoption of the Husserlian concept of “doxa” in his work may be seen as directly related to this approach. Doxa has a number of related meanings and types of understanding in Bourdieu's work but the concept broadly refers to the misrecognition of forms of social arbitrariness that engenders the unformulated, nondiscursive, but internalized and practical recognition of that same social arbitrariness. It contributes to its reproduction in social institutions, structures and relations as well as in minds and bodies, expectations and behaviour.