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1 - Introduction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 March 2021

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Summary

Between 1864 and 1870, Francisco Solano López, President of Paraguay at the time, led his nation into a war against three powerful neighbours, Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay, in what became known as the Paraguayan War, or the War of the Triple Alliance. The result of the war was catastrophic for Paraguay; 85 per cent of its population was killed, its victorious opponents imposed fines, and 142,450 km2 of territory was lost, an area nearly the size of Florida in the USA. Just as the Paraguayan nation itself perished in a bloodbath, so, too, did its leader who refused to surrender even when it was clear that he had lost (C.Q. Schneider, 2009: 3). For some, he soon became a hero, a symbol of defiant minor powers fighting for their rights. Others, however, saw him as a stubborn man consumed by his desire for greatness, pointing out that he had studied in France and was an avid admirer of Napoleon. While it is puzzling as to why López made such a tragic decision, it is even more puzzling that he was the one who initiated the conflict. Indeed, anything other than a loss would have been a surprising outcome.

Almost a century and a half later, in 2008 precisely, Mikheil Saakashvili, President of Georgia at the time, also led his small nation into a war against a vastly more powerful neighbour, Russia. The conflict became known as the Russo–Georgian war. Just like in the Paraguayan War, the weaker side lost. Luckily, because modern militaries are quicker and more accurate, Georgia escaped without serious consequences to the livelihood of its people. Georgia did, however, allow its enemy to reach the capital city, Tbilisi, and lost two problematic, separatist regions: Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Nichol, 2009: 14–15; Cherkasova, 2010: 2). Again, Saakashvili's legacy was divided between those who characterised him as a hero for standing up to a threatening major power, and those who considered him a reckless leader who had lost significant parts of the country. Not surprisingly, some studies have devoted their attention to analysing the case of Georgia and its war against Russia (Cherkasova, 2010).

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Why Minor Powers Risk Wars with Major Powers
A Comparative Study of the Post-Cold War Era
, pp. 1 - 16
Publisher: Bristol University Press
Print publication year: 2019

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  • Introduction
  • Marinko Bobić
  • Book: Why Minor Powers Risk Wars with Major Powers
  • Online publication: 10 March 2021
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.46692/9781529205213.001
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  • Introduction
  • Marinko Bobić
  • Book: Why Minor Powers Risk Wars with Major Powers
  • Online publication: 10 March 2021
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.46692/9781529205213.001
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Introduction
  • Marinko Bobić
  • Book: Why Minor Powers Risk Wars with Major Powers
  • Online publication: 10 March 2021
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.46692/9781529205213.001
Available formats
×