Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
  1. Home
  2. Books
  3. Against Knowledge Closure
  • Cited by 10
      • Show more authors
      • You may already have access via personal or institutional login
    • Select format
    • Publisher:
      Cambridge University Press
      Publication date:
      04 May 2019
      09 May 2019
      ISBN:
      9781108604093
      9781108474023
      9781108463294
      DOI:
      https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108604093
      Dimensions:
      (228 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.47kg, 254 Pages
      Dimensions:
      (229 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.381kg, 254 Pages
      • Subjects:
      Epistemology and Metaphysics, Philosophy
    You may already have access via personal or institutional login
    • Selected: Digital
    Add to cart View cart Buy from Cambridge.org
    Subjects:
    Epistemology and Metaphysics, Philosophy
    Information

    Book description

    Knowledge closure is the claim that, if an agent S knows P, recognizes that P implies Q, and believes Q because it is implied by P, then S knows Q. Closure is a pivotal epistemological principle that is widely endorsed by contemporary epistemologists. Against Knowledge Closure is the first book-length treatment of the issue and the most sustained argument for closure failure to date. Unlike most prior arguments for closure failure, Marc Alspector-Kelly's critique of closure does not presuppose any particular epistemological theory; his argument is, instead, intuitively compelling and applicable to a wide variety of epistemological views. His discussion ranges over much of the epistemological landscape, including skepticism, warrant, transmission and transmission failure, fallibilism, sensitivity, safety, evidentialism, reliabilism, contextualism, entitlement, circularity and bootstrapping, justification, and justification closure. As a result, the volume will be of interest to any epistemologist or student of epistemology and related subjects.

    Reviews

    'Marc Alspector-Kelly provides the most comprehensive treatment available of the much-debated topic of epistemic closure, and his own arguments are a valuable antidote to the current consensus in favor of closure. Henceforth, epistemologists who discuss closure will have to reckon with Alspector-Kelly’s original and sophisticated case against this principle.'

    Peter Murphy - University of Indianapolis

    Refine List

    Actions for selected content:

    Select all | Deselect all
    • View selected items
    • Export citations
    • Download PDF (zip)
    • Save to Kindle
    • Save to Dropbox
    • Save to Google Drive

    Save Search

    You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

    Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
    Cancel
    ×

    Contents

    Contents
    References

    Metrics

    Altmetric attention score

    Full text views

    Total number of HTML views: 0
    Total number of PDF views: 0 *
    Loading metrics...

    Book summary page views

    Total views: 0 *
    Loading metrics...

    * Views captured on Cambridge Core between #date#. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

    Usage data cannot currently be displayed.

    Accessibility standard: Unknown

    Why this information is here

    This section outlines the accessibility features of this content - including support for screen readers, full keyboard navigation and high-contrast display options. This may not be relevant for you.

    Accessibility Information

    Accessibility compliance for the PDF of this book is currently unknown and may be updated in the future.