It is commonly believed that our obligations toward other human beings are not restricted to abstaining from harming them. We should also prevent or alleviate harmful states of affairs for other individuals whenever it is in our power to do something about it. In animal ethics, however, the idea that we may have reasons not only to refrain from harming animals but also to help them is not particularly widespread. Of course, exceptions can be found regarding companion animals. Most people agree that failing to assist them would be wrong if we could otherwise help them. Most people give their companion animals veterinary care and believe such care should be extended to all captive animals. But what about all other animals in need, shouldn’t we also help them? Consider The Drowning Chimp case introduced at the beginning of this book. Do you have an obligation to save the chimp? Consider also the numerous rescues of animals trapped in the ice or the recent efforts of Australian authorities and communities to help kangaroos, camels, horses, koalas, alpacas, and many other animals caught in the flames to survive as well as the aerial distribution of food in the days following the fires. Isn’t that something that we ought to do?

This chapter claims that wild animals are morally considerable. Because nonhuman animals are sentient, they have a well-being of their own – a necessary and sufficient condition for having moral consideration. It further claims that this is the case independently of the theory of well-being one might endorse. It then argues that nonhuman interests in not suffering are morally relevant and that equal instances of suffering should be equally considered, irrespective of species membership. It follows that our reasons to prevent or alleviate nonhuman suffering are as strong as our reasons to prevent equal instances of human suffering. Finally, it argues for a conditional claim: If death is bad at all, then under certain theoretical assumptions, death is also bad for nonhuman animals and, sometimes, it may be comparatively worse than for human beings. If so, the nonhuman interest in continuing to live gives us additional reasons to act on behalf of wild animals, by preventing them from dying.

This book relies on two main assumptions. Here is the first one: suffering is bad. Being burned alive or starving to death make you suffer. They feel bad. If you could do something to prevent bad things from happening, or otherwise alleviate their impact on individuals, without thereby bringing about more bad things in the world, and without jeopardizing anything of similar or greater importance, you ought to do it. This is the second assumption.

This chapter examines relationality objections to intervention in nature. It starts by reconstructing Clare Palmer’s contextual approach, according to which we are not usually required to assist wild animals due to the lack of prior morally relevant entanglements with them. It rejects these grounds for determining positive obligations, arguing that it implausibly implies there is no requirement to help distant human beings in need due to natural causes or to benefit others at no cost. Next, it offers a case for construing Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka’s account in Zoopolis of our political duties toward wild animals in a way that much more pervasive interventions in nature may be required. If we have a duty to ensure that the environment meets wild animals’ needs, facts suggest that the satisfaction of wild animals’ needs does not depend on the preservation of their natural environments. Instead, we should favor some form of environmental enhancement, that is, any modification of environmental conditions with a net positive effect on nonhuman well-being.

This chapter assesses priority arguments against intervention in nature. First, on the Exclusion Approach, intervention is not a priority because equality and priority reasons simply do not apply to wild animals. Second, on the Deflation Approach, since nonhuman animals have a lower capacity for well-being, increasing wild animal well-being produces less value than increasing human well-being. Third, on the Perfectionist Approach, increases in nonhuman well-being cannot compensate for the loss of “the best things in life,” only attainable by human activity. We should, thus, give priority to increases in human well-being that ensure the existence of excellent goods. It is argued that all approaches have highly unacceptable results, particularly on the negative scale of well-being. Finally, the chapter considers the Domesticated Animals First objection, according to which priority should be given to alleviating the harms suffered by domesticated animals. It is argued that taken either as a substantive or as a strategic objection, it cannot soundly succeed.

This chapter examines the concept of speciesism by committing itself to an ameliorative inquiry. Accordingly, when engaging in antispeciesist theory, “speciesism” should be reserved for the unjustified instances of disadvantageous consideration or treatment of individuals, either by an appeal to species membership or by an appeal to other allegedly species-specific attributes. Next, it disputes the claim that anthropocentrism and speciesism are equivalent notions and that anthropocentrism, because it is inevitable, justifies speciesism. It then provides additional reasons for why anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric versions of speciesism are unjustified. Finally, it assesses a position that might be construed as a further instance of discrimination – modal personism. It concludes by suggesting that as an account of moral considerability, personism – modal or actual – is deeply flawed and should be rejected.

By elaborating on Albert O. Hirschman’s map of the rhetoric of reaction, which identifies the main theses of conservatism in its opposition to social change (perversity, futility, jeopardy), this chapter considers the first set of objections that might be put forward against intervention: perversity and futility. According to perversity objections, we should refrain from intervening because intervention will actually make things worse. According to futility objections, intervention should not be attempted because it is bound to fail, due to either structural or substantive limitations. It subjects these objections to Bostrom and Ord’s Reversal Test and identifies instances of status quo biases in them, providing us with additional reasons to reject them. It concludes that, at most, these objections suggest what the interventionist may easily concede: That intervention should be performed just in case it is informed and when the expected outcome is net positive for wild animals.

This chapter examines jeopardy objections, according to which intervention in nature should be prevented insofar as it will threaten other, more important values. Depending on the theory endorsed, these values vary, including the preservation of ecosystems or species (holism), living entities such as plants and other non-sentient organisms (biocentrism), or the “natural” and “the wilderness.” It argues that both holistic and biocentric views either rely on an irrational preference for the status quo or they build their case on implausible axiological assumptions that lead to unacceptable consequences for human interests. Finally, the so-called “natural,” understood as the result of evolution or as the natural wilderness, is revealed, at most, as possessing a kind of value that can be easily outweighed by that of nonhuman well-being. Appeals to the natural cannot in any case ground an opposition to helping wild animals across the board.

This chapter claims that wild animal suffering is not intractable, nor interventions to reduce it are infeasible. To label certain interventions to reduce wild animal suffering as infeasible is merely to state that we cannot achieve them given our current state of knowledge. This is, at best, only partially true, considering the array of low-impact interventions presently available. At any rate, the fundamental discussion is not about which ways of helping animals in nature are already available, but rather whether we have reasons to develop the means that will make it increasingly more feasible to help them. Feasibility should be understood dynamically and conditional upon trying. With regard to large-scale interventions, we can affect their feasibility by putting ourselves in a position to achieve them, both individually and collectively. This could mainly be done by developing welfare biology as a new field of research as well as by adopting a future-focused approach to animal advocacy.

This chapter defends the claim that suffering is likely prevalent in wild animals’ lives. It does so by describing the different ways in which the interests of wild animals are systematically frustrated by natural events. These include the wasteful reproductive strategy favored by the majority of wild animals and the enormous variety of natural threats to their health, as well as physical and psychological integrity. It ends by presenting a minimal case for intervention in nature. On the assumption that (i) we ought to aim at preventing or reducing the harms suffered by other individuals whenever it is in our power to do so, if (ii) all sentient individuals, including nonhuman animals, are fully morally considerable and (iii) suffering likely prevails in nature, then (iv) we have reasons to intervene in nature so as to alleviate wild animal suffering as much as possible.