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  • Cited by 25
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    This book has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Buijsman, Stefan 2016. Accessibility of reformulated mathematical content. Synthese,


    Peet, Andrew 2016. Testimony and the epistemic uncertainty of interpretation. Philosophical Studies, Vol. 173, Issue. 2, p. 395.


    Wright, Stephen 2016. Internalism in the Epistemology of Testimony. Erkenntnis, Vol. 81, Issue. 1, p. 69.


    Goldberg, Sandy 2015. Epistemic Entitlement and Luck. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 91, Issue. 2, p. 273.


    Miller, Boaz 2015. WHY (SOME) KNOWLEDGE IS THE PROPERTY OF A COMMUNITY AND POSSIBLY NONE OF ITS MEMBERS. The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 65, Issue. 260, p. 417.


    Peet, Andrew 2015. Testimonial Knowledge Without Knowledge of What Is Said. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, p. n/a.


    Pollock, Joey 2015. Social externalism and the problem of communication. Philosophical Studies, Vol. 172, Issue. 12, p. 3229.


    Begby, Endre 2014. Lexical norms, language comprehension, and the epistemology of testimony. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 44, Issue. 3-4, p. 324.


    Gelfert, Axel 2013. Coverage-Reliability, Epistemic Dependence, and the Problem of Rumor-Based Belief. Philosophia, Vol. 41, Issue. 3, p. 763.


    Goldberg, Sandy 2013. Self-Trust and Extended Trust: A Reliabilist Account. Res Philosophica, Vol. 90, Issue. 2, p. 277.


    Miller, Boaz 2013. When is consensus knowledge based? Distinguishing shared knowledge from mere agreement. Synthese, Vol. 190, Issue. 7, p. 1293.


    Shieber, Joseph 2013. Toward a Truly Social Epistemology: Babbage, the Division of Mental Labor, and the Possibility of Socially Distributed Warrant. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 86, Issue. 2, p. 266.


    Butts, Evan 2012. Mentalism is not epistemic ur-internalism. Philosophical Explorations, Vol. 15, Issue. 2, p. 233.


    Goldberg, Sanford C. 2012. Epistemic extendedness, testimony, and the epistemology of instrument-based belief. Philosophical Explorations, Vol. 15, Issue. 2, p. 181.


    Shieber, Joseph 2012. Against Credibility. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 90, Issue. 1, p. 1.


    Faulkner, Paul 2011. Handbook of Pragmatics.


    Goldberg, Sandy 2011. The Division of Epistemic Labor. Episteme, Vol. 8, Issue. 01, p. 112.


    Goldberg, Sanford C. 2011. The metasemantics of memory. Philosophical Studies, Vol. 153, Issue. 1, p. 95.


    Marsh, Leslie 2011. Hayek in Mind: Hayek's Philosophical Psychology.


    Goldberg, Sanford 2010. Comments on Miranda Fricker'sEpistemic Injustice. Episteme, Vol. 7, Issue. 2, p. 138.


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    Anti-Individualism
    • Online ISBN: 9780511487521
    • Book DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511487521
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Book description

Sanford C. Goldberg argues that a proper account of the communication of knowledge through speech has anti-individualistic implications for both epistemology and the philosophy of mind and language. In Part I he offers a novel argument for anti-individualism about mind and language, the view that the contents of one's thoughts and the meanings of one's words depend for their individuation on one's social and natural environment. In Part II he discusses the epistemic dimension of knowledge communication, arguing that the epistemic characteristics of communication-based beliefs depend on features of the cognitive and linguistic acts of the subject's social peers. In acknowledging an ineliminable social dimension to mind, language, and the epistemic categories of knowledge, justification, and rationality, his book develops fundamental links between externalism in the philosophy of mind and language, on the one hand, and externalism is epistemology, on the other.

Reviews

'Goldberg's book is an important contribution to philosophy of language and mind, as well as epistemology. For anyone who is, or aspires to be, a serious participant in the epistemology of testimony it is a 'must study'.'

Source: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

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This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.


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