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  3. Appointing Central Bankers
  • Cited by 23
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    • Publisher:
      Cambridge University Press
      Publication date:
      05 September 2009
      18 August 2003
      ISBN:
      9780511510526
      9780521823333
      9780521029841
      DOI:
      https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511510526
      Dimensions:
      (228 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.392kg, 176 Pages
      Dimensions:
      (228 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.273kg, 176 Pages
      • Series:
      Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
      Subjects:
      Area Studies, American Studies, American Government, Politics and Policy, Political Economy, Politics and International Relations
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    Series:
    Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
    Subjects:
    Area Studies, American Studies, American Government, Politics and Policy, Political Economy, Politics and International Relations
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    Book description

    This book examines monetary policy by focusing on how the President and the Senate influence monetary policy by appointing Federal Reserve members. It attempts to answer three questions about the appointment process and its effects. First, do politicians influence monetary policy through Federal Reserve appointments? Second, who influences the process - the President alone or both the President and the Senate? Third, what explains the structure of the Federal Reserve appointment process? The test models show that the President alone, both the President and Senate, or neither, may influence monetary policy with Federal Reserve appointments. The structure of the process reflects political battles between the Democrats and Republicans regarding the centralization of authority to set monetary policy within the Federal Reserve System. The study extends the analysis to the European Central Bank and shows that the Federal Reserve process is more representative of society than the European Central Bank process.

    Reviews

    "Appointing Central Bankers makes an important contribution to our understanding of appointment power dynamics and impact on monetary policy in the United States and the European Central Bank. It is a "must read" for students of these institutions and should become an important methodological reference for students of other central banks and other types of regulatory agencies."
    Irwin L. Morris, Perspectives on Politics

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