The immediate reason for which artefacts are not substances is arrived at only by means of the consideration of matter as parts and the focus on the relation of parts and whole, which is undertaken in this chapter. Indeed, artefacts fail to satisfy the substantiality criterion, according to which no substance is composed of parts present in it in actuality (Met. Z 13). I show that Aristotle regards living beings as constituted of parts in potentiality, while he conceives of artefacts as constituted of parts present in actuality. Because their parts are in actuality, artefacts are not as unified as substances, but because artefacts still possess an inherent form, they cannot be downgraded to mere heaps. Thus, artefacts are hylomorphic compounds, but not substances at all.

The Physics constitutes a fruitful starting point for our study of Aristotle’s metaphysics of artefacts. This chapter shows that we can glean from Aristotle’s Physics an account of artefacts that is not only compatible with, but also directly related to the account offered in the Metaphysics. This account chiefly consists of: (1) the art analogy and (2) the fundamental distinction between artefacts and natural beings. Another Aristotelian conceptual tool I discuss in this chapter and is provided by the Physics is the distinction between ‘artificially caused’ and ‘artefact’. This survey will accomplish two tasks: it will present typical artefacts (i.e. generally accepted members of artificial kinds that are brought about by art) and it will open space for the conceptual possibility that art might be able to bring about things that are not artefacts proper. By identifying the building blocks presented in the Physics and presupposed in the Metaphysics, this chapter also lays the foundations for the remainder of the book.

Chapter 4 argues that those material objects that, in the Categories, would fall under the category of substance qualify as hylomorphic compounds (i.e. they have matter and form). It presents three arguments in defence of the thesis that artefacts have forms. The first argument is that artefacts undergo genuine unqualified coming-to-be (or substantial change), as opposed to the mere acquisition of a property by a substrate. Related to this argument is the crucial Aristotelian distinction between per se unity and accidental unity. The second argument is based on Aristotle’s application of the ekeininon-rule to artefacts, which reveals that the identity of an artificial object cannot be reduced to its matter. (The third argument is that Aristotle’s application of the synonymy principle to artefacts shows that the form in the mind of the artisan is identical to the form present in the actual artefact, insofar as it is thought, and that the artisan’s use of tools represents the stage at which the artefact’s form is in potentiality.

This book concerns the ontological status of products of art (technê) in Aristotle, in particular material objects. It makes three main advances with respect to the existing literature: the first will be of interest to contemporary metaphysicians, the second to historians of philosophy, and the third to both contemporary metaphysicians and historians of philosophy. First, the metaphysics of artefacts is increasingly gaining the attention of contemporary metaphysicians, in particular among supporters of hylomorphism, who all refer to or draw on Aristotle. However, there is no consensus about the place of artefacts within Aristotle’s ontology; indeed, there is no consensus as to whether Aristotle articulates a single coherent account of artefacts in the first place. Hence, the first contribution made by this book is to offer a complete picture of Aristotle’s account of artefacts that is sensitive to current issues and that can therefore serve as a guide for the contemporary (neo-)Aristotelian debate. Second, when it comes to technê, historians of philosophy have primarily focused on the art analogy and Aristotle’s use of examples taken from the artificial realm.

Chapter 4 argues that those material objects that, in the Categories, would fall under the category of substance qualify as hylomorphic compounds (i.e. they have matter and form). It presents three arguments in defence of the thesis that artefacts have forms. The first argument is that artefacts undergo genuine unqualified coming-to-be (or substantial change), as opposed to the mere acquisition of a property by a substrate. Related to this argument is the crucial Aristotelian distinction between per se unity and accidental unity. The second argument is based on Aristotle’s application of the ekeininon-rule to artefacts, which reveals that the identity of an artificial object cannot be reduced to its matter. The third argument is that Aristotle’s application of the synonymy principle to artefacts shows that the form in the mind of the artisan is identical to the form present in the actual artefact, insofar as it is thought, and that the artisan’s use of tools represents the stage at which the artefact’s form is in potentiality.

This chapter outlines Plato’s metaphysics of artefacts on the basis of his explicit references to Ideas of artefacts in the Cratylus and Republic X, his discussion of the eidetic cosmos presented in the Parmenides and the description of the material world as a product of the divine artisan in the Timaeus. The second section presents the shortcomings of Plato’s account detected by Aristotle and addressed through artefacts: these are Plato’s failure to recognise final causes and the concept of imitation. The third section outlines the metaphysical intuitions upon which Aristotle builds by taking artefacts into account. The roots of certain metaphysical problems are not explicitly identified as Platonic, but they are arguably to be found in the Platonic corpus. These problems concern the range of things that have a form, the separation between axiology and metaphysics, the concept of real kinds and the relation between parts and whole.

The metaphysics of artefacts is increasingly gaining the attention of contemporary metaphysicians, particularly among supporters of hylomorphism, who all refer to or draw on Aristotle. However, there is no consensus about the place of artefacts in Aristotle’s ontology. Not only that, but there is no consensus as to whether Aristotle even has a single coherent account of artefacts in the first place. This book has shown that Aristotle does present a coherent and detailed account of artefacts. I shall now summarise the conclusions that have been reached in a manner that is sensitive to currently discussed issues, so as to provide a guide for the contemporary (Neo)-Aristotelian debate.

Chapter 5 argues that the identification of the form in the mind of the artisan with art amounts to ascribing it the role of efficient cause. As the chapter explains, the form in the mind of the artisan is responsible for both qualified and unqualified coming-to-be. Art is the only form that is an efficient cause, in contrast to the form inherent in the artefact. By resorting to Aristotle’s biological works, the chapter clarifies how artefacts come to lack an inner principle of their behaviour and how this is connected with their lack of an inner principle of unqualified coming-to-be. Two theses in particular are challenged. The first is that the form is transmitted from the mind to the object and, as a result, the form of an artefact is potential, because this is the status of the form in the mind in the artisan. The second thesis is that artefacts are not substances because their forms are not principles of changes. The chapter concludes with a reflection on the relation between eternity and substantiality.

Chapter 2 addresses Aristotle’s use of artefacts as counterexamples or central elements in counter-arguments against Plato and the Academy. The common opinion, within the Academy, that there cannot exist Ideas of artefacts is used by Aristotle to highlight the internal incoherence of the Platonic theory (Met. A 9, 990b8–15; Met. B 4, 999b15–20; Met. K 2, 1060b23–8). Moreover, the case of artefacts offers evidence that Ideas are either inert thus superflous (Met. A 9, 991b1–7; GC 2.9, 335b18–24), or even in contradiction with the coming-to-be of individual substances (Met. Z 8, 1033b19–24). The chapter shows that in these passages Aristotle is using artefacts dialectically against Plato’s separation of Ideas and concludes with a reflection on the notions of separation and substantiality.

This final chapter shows how further enquiry into artefacts’ metaphysics forces us to return to artefacts’ physics. At the same time, this further enquiry is in turn shown to fall outside the interests of a metaphysician and to be the task of a natural philosopher. For this reason, the chapter looks at artefacts as objects of inquiry and distinguishes between perspective of the natural scientist, the maker, and the user on the one hand, and the perspective of the metaphysician on the other. This discussion allows us to wrap up the results, to reassess the relationship between the Physics and the Metaphysics, and to evaluate the respective contributions of these works to Aristotle’s ontology of artefacts.