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    • Publisher:
      Cambridge University Press
      Publication date:
      07 October 2011
      19 September 1985
      ISBN:
      9780511895975
      9780521071291
      Dimensions:
      Weight & Pages:
      Dimensions:
      (216 x 140 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.36kg, 280 Pages
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    Book description

    This book develops in detail the simple idea that assertion is the expression of belief. In it the author puts forward a version of 'probabilistic semantics' which acknowledges that we are not perfectly rational, and which offers a significant advance in generality on theories of meaning couched in terms of truth conditions. It promises to challenge a number of entrenched and widespread views about the relations of language and mind. Part I presents a functionalist account of belief, worked through a modified form of decision theory. In Part II the author generates a theory of meaning in terms of 'assertibility conditions', whereby to know the meaning of an assertion is to know the belief it expresses.

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    Contents

    • Frontmatter
      pp i-vi
    • Contents
      pp vii-x
    • Acknowledgements
      pp xi-xii
    • Notation
      pp xiii-xiv
    • 1 - Cartesianism, behaviourism and the philosophical context
      pp 1-8
    • Part I - Belief
      pp 9-10
    • 2 - A theory of the mind
      pp 11-38
    • 3 - Belief and decision
      pp 39-72
    • 4 - Computation
      pp 73-99
    • 5 - Truth conditions
      pp 100-120
    • Part II - Meaning
      pp 121-122
    • 6 - Realism and truth-theory
      pp 123-142
    • 7 - Assertion
      pp 143-158
    • Part III - Conditionals
      pp 159-160
    • 8 - Indicative conditionals
      pp 161-191
    • 9 - Truth and triviality
      pp 192-212
    • 10 - Logic without truth
      pp 213-233
    • 11 - Generalising the probabilistic semantics of conditionals
      pp 234-252
    • Epilogue
      pp 253-253
    • Bibliography
      pp 254-261
    • Index of names
      pp 262-263
    • Index of key terms
      pp 264-265

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