References
Adams, M. M. (1999) Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Adams, R. M. (1972) Must God create the best? The Philosophical Review 81: 317–332.
Adams, R. M. (1999) Finite and Infinite Goods. New York: Oxford University Press.
Almeida, M. (2017a) The Multiverse and divine creation. Religions 8: 1–10.
Almeida, M. (2017b) Theistic modal realism I: the challenge of theistic actualism. Philosophy Compass 12: 1–14.
Almeida, M. (2017c) Theistic modal realism II: theoretical benefits. Philosophy Compass 12: 1–17.
Almeida, M. (2018) Cosmological Arguments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Almeida, M. (2020a) On discovering God in the pluriverse. In Lougheed, K., ed., Four Views on the Axiology of Theism. London: Bloomsbury, pp. 19–40.
Almeida, M. (2020b) On necessary gratuitous evils. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion.
Beilby, J. (2002) Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Bergmann, M. and Cover, J. A. (2006) Divine responsibility without divine freedom. Faith and Philosophy 23: 381–408.
Beshears, K. (2019) Athens without a statue to the unknown God. Themelios 44: 517–529.
Bradley, B. (2006) Against satisficing consequentialism. Utilitas 18: 97–108.
Buckareff, A. and Nagasawa, Y., eds. (2016) Alternative Concepts of God: Essays on the Metaphysics of the Divine. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Byerly, T. R. (2018) Ordinary morality does not imply atheism. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 83: 85–96.
Byerly, T. R. and Silverman, E., eds. (2017) Paradise Understood: New Philosophical Essays about Heaven. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Byron, M. (1998) Satisficing and optimality. Ethics 109: 67–93.
Chang, R. (1997) Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Climenhaga, N. (2018) Infinite value and the best of all possible worlds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97: 367–392.
Crummett, D. (2017) Sufferer-centered requirements on theodicy and all-things-considered harms. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 8: 71–95.
Crummett, D. (2019) Review of Kraay, K., ed. Does God Matter: Essays on the Axiological Consequences of Theism. Faith and Philosophy 36: 396–402.
Daeley, J. (2019) The necessity of the best possible world, divine thankworthiness, and grace. Sophia 58: 423–435.
Davis, R. and Franks, W.P. (2015) Counterpossibles and the “terrible” divine command deity. Religious Studies 51: 1–19.
Davis, S. T. (2014) On preferring that God not exist (or that God exist): a dialogue. Faith and Philosophy 31: 143–159.
Davison, S. (1997) Privacy and control. Faith and Philosophy 14: 137–151.
Davison, S. (2018) God and intrinsic value. In Kraay, K. J., ed., Does God Matter? Essays on the Axiological Consequences of Theism. New York: Routledge, pp. 39–45.
Diller, J. and Kasher, A. (2013) Models of God and Alternative Ultimate Realities. Dordrecht: Springer.
Dreier, J. (2004) Why ethical satisficing makes sense and rational satisficing doesn’t. In Byron, M., ed., Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 131–154.
Dumsday, T. (2016) Anti-theism and the problem of divine hiddenness. Sophia 55: 179–195.
Dumsday, T. (2020) The axiology of theism: expanding the contrast classes. In Lougheed, K., ed., Four Views on the Axiology of Theism: What Difference Does God Make? London: Bloomsbury, pp. 59–78.
Elliot, D. and Soifer, E. (2017) Divine omniscience, privacy, and the state. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 82: 251–271.
Evans, C. S. (2013) God and Moral Obligation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fales, E. (1994) Divine freedom and the choice of a world. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 35: 65–88.
Falls-Corbitt, M. and McLain, F. M. (1992) God and privacy. Faith and Philosophy 9: 369–386.
Flint, T. P. (1983) The problem of divine freedom. American Philosophical Quarterly 20: 255–264.
Forrest, P. (1981) The problem of evil: two neglected defences. Sophia 20: 49–54.
Gellman, J. (2010) On God, suffering, and theodical individualism. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 1: 187–191.
Grover, S. (1988) Why only the best is good enough. Analysis 48: 224.
Grover, S. (2003) This world, “Adams worlds,” and the best of all possible worlds. Religious Studies 39: 145–163.
Grover, S. (2004) Rival creator arguments and the best of all possible worlds. Sophia 43: 101–114.
Guleserian, T. (1983) God and possible worlds: the modal problem of evil. Noûs 17: 221–238.
Hall, R. L. (2020) On being known: God and the private-I. Sophia 59: 621–636.
Hallett, G. (2001) The tedium of immortality. Faith and Philosophy 18: 279–291.
Hare, J. (2015) God’s Command. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hasker, W. (1992) The necessity of gratuitous evil. Faith and Philosophy 9: 23–44.
Hasker, W. (2004) Can God permit “just enough” evil? In Hasker, W., ed. Providence, Evil, and The Openness of God. New York: Routledge, pp. 81–94.
Hasker, W. (2008) The Triumph of God over Evil: Theodicy for a World of Suffering. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press.
Hasker, W. (2019) God and gratuitous evil: a response to Klaas Kraay. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 9: 54–67.
Hedberg, T. and Huzarevich, J. (2017) Appraising objections to practical apatheism. Philosophia 45: 257–276.
Hendricks, P. (2020) Skeptical theism, pro-theism, and anti-theism. In Lougheed, K., ed., Four Views on the Axiology of Theism: What Difference Does God Make? London: Bloomsbury, pp. 95–115.
Hendricks, P. and Lougheed, K. (2019) Undermining the axiological solution to divine hiddenness. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 86: 3–15.
Howard-Snyder, D. (1996) The argument from divine hiddenness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26: 433–453.
Johnson, D. K. (2014) The failure of the multiverse hypothesis as a solution to the problem of no best world. Sophia 53: 447–465.
Johnston, M. (2019) Why did the one not remain within itself? Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 9: 106–164.
Jordan, J. (2003) Evil and Van Inwagen. Faith and Philosophy 20: 236–239.
Jordan, J. (2004) Divine love and human suffering. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 56: 169–178.
Kahane, G. (2011) Should we want God to exist? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82: 674–696.
Kahane, G. (2014) Our cosmic insignificance. Noûs 48: 745–772.
Kahane, G. (2018) If there is a hole, it is not God-shaped. In Kraay, K., ed., Does God Matter? Essays on the Axiological Consequences of Theism. New York: Routledge, pp. 95–131.
Kahane, G. (forthcoming) Is anti-theism incoherent? American Philosophical Quarterly.
Kant, I. (1978) Lectures on Philosophical Theology. Trans. A. W. Wood and G. M. Clark. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Kraal, A. (2013) Is the existence of the best possible world logically impossible? International Philosophical Quarterly 53: 37–46.
Kraay, K. J. (2008a) Can God choose a world at random? In Wielenberg, E. and Nagasawa, Y., eds., New Waves in Philosophy of Religion. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 22–35.
Kraay, K. J. (2008b) Creation, world-actualization, and God’s choice among possible worlds. Philosophy Compass 3: 854–872.
Kraay, K. J. (2010a) The problem of no best world. In Taliaferro, C., Draper, P., and Quinn, P., eds., A Companion to Philosophy of Religion (2nd ed.), Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 481–491.
Kraay, K. J. (2010b) Theism, possible worlds, and the multiverse. Philosophical Studies 147: 355–368.
Kraay, K. J. (2011) Theism and modal collapse. American Philosophical Quarterly 48: 361–372.
Kraay, K. J. (2012) The theistic multiverse: problems and prospects. In Nagasawa, Y., ed., Scientific Approaches to the Philosophy of Religion. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 143–162.
Kraay, K. J. (2013a) Can God satisfice? American Philosophical Quarterly 50: 399–410.
Kraay, K. J. (2014) Peter van Inwagen on gratuitous evil. Religious Studies 50: 217–234.
Kraay, K. J., ed. (2015) God and the Multiverse: Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Perspectives. New York: Routledge.
Kraay, K. J. (2018a) Invitation to the axiology of theism. In Kraay, K. J., ed., Does God Matter? Essays on the Axiological Consequences of Theism. New York: Routledge, pp. 1–36.
Kraay, K. J. (2018b) One philosopher’s bug can be another’s feature: reply to Almeida’s “Multiverse and Divine Creation.” Religions 9: 55–63.
Kraay, K. J. (2019) Theism, pro-theism, Hasker, and gratuitous evil. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 9: 31–53.
Kraay, K. J. (forthcoming) Is motivated submaximization good enough for God? Religious Studies.
Kraay, K. J. and Dragos, C. (2013) On preferring God’s non-existence. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43: 153–178.
Kretzmann, N. (1990a) A general problem of creation: why would God create anything at all? In McDonald, S., ed., Being and Goodness. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 208–228.
Kretzmann, N. (1990b) A particular problem of creation: why would God create this world? In McDonald, S., ed., Being and Goodness. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 229–249.
Lackey, D. P. (1985) Divine omniscience and human privacy. Philosophy Research Archives 10: 383–391.
Leftow, B. 2005. The ontological argument. In Wainwright, W., ed., The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 80–115.
Leftow, B. 2010. Necessity. In Taliaferro, C. and Meister, C., eds., The Cambridge Companion to Philosophical Theology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 15–30.
Leftow, B. 2017. Two pictures of divine choice. In McCann, H. J., ed., Free Will and Classical Theism: The Significance of Perfect Being Theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 152–172.
Leftow, B. (forthcoming) Divine freedom. In Campbell, J., ed., The Wiley Companion to Free Will. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
Leibniz, G. W. (1902) Discourse on Metaphysics. Trans. G. Montgomery. La Salle: Open Court.
Leibniz, G. W. (1986) Theodicy. Ed. Farrer, A.. , Trans. E. M. Huggard. La Salle: Open Court.
Lewis, D. (1986) On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.
Lewis, D. (1993) Evil for freedom’s sake? Philosophical Papers 22: 149–172.
Licon, J. (forthcoming) Aspirational theism and gratuitous suffering. Religious Studies.
Lougheed, K. (2017) Anti-theism and the objective meaningful life argument. Dialogue 56: 337–355.
Lougheed, K. (2018a) The axiological solution to divine hiddenness. Ratio 31: 331–341.
Lougheed, K. (2018b) On the axiology of a hidden god. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10: 79–95.
Lougheed, K., ed. (2020a) Four Views on the Axiology of Theism: What Difference Does God Make? London: Bloomsbury.
Lougheed, K. (2020b) The Axiological Status of Theism and Other Worldviews. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Lovejoy, A. O. (1936) The Great Chain of Being. Boston, MA: Harvard University Press.
Lovering, R. (2011) Does ordinary morality imply atheism? A reply to Maitzen. Forum Philosophicum 16: 83–98.
Mackie, J. L. (1955) Evil and omnipotence. Mind 64: 200–212.
Maitzen, S. (2009) Ordinary morality implies atheism. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 1: 107–126.
Maitzen, S. (2010) On Gellman’s attempted rescue. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2: 193–198.
Maitzen, S. (2013) Atheism and the basis of morality. In Musschenga, A. W. and van Harskamp, A., eds., What Makes Us Moral? Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 257–269.
Maitzen, S. (2018) The Problem of Magic. In Kraay, K.. Does God Matter? Essays on the Axiological Consequences of Theism. New York: Routledge, pp. 132–146.
Maitzen, S. (2019) Normative objections to theism. In Oppy, G., ed., A Companion to Atheism and Philosophy, Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, pp. 204–215.
Manson, N. A., ed. (2003) God and Design: The Teleological Argument and Modern Science. London: Routledge.
Martin, M. and Monnier, R., eds., (2003) The Impossibility of God. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.
Mawson, T.J. (2011) Theodical individualism. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3: 139–159.
Mawson, T.J. (2012). On determining how important it is whether or not there is a God. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4: 95–105.
Mawson, T.J. (2016) God and the Meanings of Life. New York: Bloomsbury.
Mawson, T.J. (2018) An agreeable answer to a pro-theism/anti-theism question. In Kraay, K., ed., Does God Matter? Essays on the Axiological Consequences of Theism. New York: Routledge, pp. 70–92.
McBrayer, J. and Howard-Snyder, D., eds., (2013) The Blackwell Companion to The Problem of Evil. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
McKim, R. (2001) Religious Ambiguity and Religious Diversity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Metz, T. (2013b) Meaning in Life: An Analytic Study. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Metz, T. (2019) God, Soul, and the Meaning of Life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Morris, T. (1987) The necessity of God’s goodness. In Anselmian Explorations: Essays in Philosophical Theology. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 42–69.
Moser, P. (2013) On the axiology of theism: reply to Klaas J. Kraay. Toronto Journal of Theology 29: 271–276.
Mulgan, T. (2001) How satisficers get away with murder. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9: 41–6.
Murphy, M. (2011) God and Moral Law: On the Theistic Explanation of Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Murray, M. (2002) Deus absconditus. In Howard-Snyder, D. and Moser, P., eds., Divine Hiddenness: New Essays. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 62–82.
Nagasawa, Y. (forthcoming) Pro-immortalism and pro-mortalism. In Byerly, T. R., ed., Death, Immortality, and Eternal Life. London: Routledge.
Naylor, M. (2020) Satisfactory accounts of divine creation. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 88: 249–258.
Nelson, M. (1996) Who are the best judges of theistic arguments? Sophia 35: 1–12.
Nielsen, K. (1973) Ethics without God. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books.
O’Connor, D. (1998) God and Inscrutable Evil: In Defense of Theism and Atheism, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
Oppy, G. (1998) Judging theistic arguments. Sophia 37: 30–43.
Oppy, G. (2020) Naturalistic axiology. In Lougheed, K., ed., Four Views on the Axiology of Theism. London: Bloomsbury, pp. 138–155.
Penner, M. A. (2015) Personal anti-theism and the meaningful life argument. Faith and Philosophy 32: 325–337.
Penner, M. A. (2018) On the objective meaningful life argument: a response to Kirk Lougheed. Dialogue 57: 173–182.
Penner, M.A. and Lougheed, K. (2015). Pro-theism and the added value of morally good agents. Philosophia Christi 17: 53–69.
Plantinga, A. (1974a) God, Freedom, and Evil. New York: Harper and Row.
Plantinga, A. (1974b) The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Plantinga, A. (2004) Supralapsarianism, or “O Felix Culpa.” In van Inwagen, P., ed., Christian Faith and the Problem of Evil. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, pp. 1–25.
Plato, . (1980) Euthyphro. Trans. L. Cooper. In Hamilton, E. and Cairns, H., eds. The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Including the Letters. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 169–185
Plato, . (1980) Timaeus. Trans. B. Jowett. In Hamilton, E. and Cairns, H., eds. The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Including the Letters. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 1151–1211.
Pollock, J. (1983) How do you maximize expectation value? Noûs 17: 409–21.
Quinn, P. L. (1978) Divine Commands and Moral Requirements. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Quinn, P. L. (1982). God, moral perfection, and possible worlds. In Sontag, F. and Bryant, M.D., eds., God: The Contemporary Discussion. New York: The Rose of Sharon Press, pp. 197–213.
Rasmussen, J. and Leon, F. (2019) Is God the Best Explanation of Things? A Dialogue. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Reichenbach, B. (1982) Evil and a Good God. New York: Fordham University Press.
Rescher, N. (1990) On faith and belief. In Human Interests: Reflections on Philosophical Anthropology. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 167–178.
Richardson, H.S. (1994) Satisficing: not good enough. In Byron, M., ed., Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 106–130.
Rowe, W.L. (1979) The problem of evil and some varieties of atheism. American Philosophical Quarterly 16: 335–341.
Rowe, W.L. (1993) The problem of divine perfection and freedom. In Stump, E., ed., Reasoned Faith. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 223–233.
Rowe, W.L. (1996) William Alston on the problem of evil. In Senor, T., ed., The Rationality of Belief and the Plurality of Faiths. Cornell, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 71–93.
Rowe, W.L. (2004) Can God be Free? Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rowe, W.L. and Kraay, K. (forthcoming) Divine freedom. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Rubio, D. (2020) In defence of no best world. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98: 811–825.
Schellenberg, J. L. (1993) Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Schellenberg, J. L. (2007) The Wisdom to Doubt: A Justification of Religious Skepticism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Schellenberg, J. L. (2015) The Hiddenness Argument: Philosophy’s New Challenge to Belief in God. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schellenberg, J.L. (2018) Triple transcendence, the value of God’s existence, and a new route to atheism. In Kraay, K., ed., Does God Matter? Essays on the Axiological Consequences of Theism. New York: Routledge, pp. 181–191.
Schlesinger, G. (1977) Religion and Scientific Method. Dordrecht, Reidel.
Schmidtz, D. (2004) Satisficing as a humanly rational strategy. In Byron, M., ed., Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 30–58.
Seachris, J., ed. (2013). Exploring the Meaning of Life: An Anthology and Guide. Malden, MA: Wiley: Blackwell.
Seachris, J. and Goetz, S. (2020) What is This Thing called The Meaning of Life? New York: Routledge.
Senor, T. (2008) Defending divine freedom. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 1: 168–195.
Slote, M. (1989) Beyond Optimizing: A Study of Rational Choice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Sobel, J.H. (2004) Logic and Theism: Arguments for and against Beliefs in God. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sorensen, R. (1994) Infinite decision theory. In Jordan., J., ed., Gambling with God: Essays on Pascal’s Wager. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 139–159.
Sorensen, R. (2006) Originless sin: a rational dilemma for satisficers. Philosophical Quarterly 56: 213–223.
Stump, E. (1990) Providence and the problem of evil. In Flint, T., ed. Christian Philosophy. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 51–91.
Stump, E. (2010) Wandering In Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Swinburne, R. (2004) The Existence of God (2nd ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Swinburne, R. (2016) The Coherence of Theism (2nd ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Swinburne, R. (1998) Providence and the Problem of Evil. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Talbott, T. (2014) The Inescapable Love of God. Eugene, OR: Cascade Books.
Taliaferro, C. (1989) Does God violate your right to privacy? Theology 92: 190–196.
Tooley, M. (1991) The argument from evil. Philosophical Perspectives 5: 88–134.
Tooley, M. (2018) Axiology: theism versus widely accepted monotheisms. In Kraay, K., ed., Does God Matter? Essays on the Axiological Consequences of Theism. New York: Routledge, pp. 46–69.
Tucker, C. (2016) Satisficing and motivated submaximization (in the philosophy of religion). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93: 127–143.
Ullman-Margalit, E. and Morganbesser, S. (1977) Picking and choosing. Social Research 44: 757–785.
Van Inwagen, P. (1988) The place of chance in a world sustained by God. In Morris, T. V., ed., Divine and Human Action. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 211–235.
Van Inwagen, P. (1998) Modal epistemology. Philosophical Studies 92: 67–84.
Van Inwagen, P. (2006) The Problem of Evil. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wainwright, W. (2005) Religion and Morality. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Walls, J. (1992) Hell: The Logic of Damnation. South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press.
Walls, J. (2007) Heaven: The Logic of Eternal Joy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wielenberg, E. (2004) A morally unsurpassable God must create the best. Religious Studies 40: 43–62.
Wielenberg, E. (2005) Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wielenberg, E. (2018) The absurdity of life in a Christian universe as a reason to prefer that God not exist. In Kraay, K., ed., Does God Matter? Essays on the Axiological Consequences of Theism. New York: Routledge, pp. 147–163.
Wierenga, E. (2002) The freedom of God. Faith and Philosophy 19: 425–436.
Williams, B. (1973) The Makropulos case: reflections on the tedium of immortality. In Problems of the Self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 82–100.
Wykstra, S. (1984) The Humean obstacle to evidential arguments from suffering: on avoiding the evils of ‘appearance.’ International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16: 73–93.
Zagzebski, L. (2008) Omnisubjectivity. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 1: 231–248.
Zagzebski, L. (2013) Omnisubjectivity: A Defense of a Divine Attribute. Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press.
Zagzebski, L. (2016) Omnisubjectivity: why it is a divine attribute. Nova et Vetera 14: 435–450.
