INTRODUCTION

In Chapter 2 I developed a theory of aggregation incentives that stressed the interaction of the size of the aggregation payoff (itself a product of vertical and horizontal centralization) with the probability of capturing that prize. In this chapter, I turn to the task of testing some of the theory's hypotheses using a dataset of 280 elections in 46 countries. In Chapters 5 and 6, I conduct further tests of the theory using data from Thailand and the Philippines. The chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I discuss the operationalization and measurement of the dependent variable – party system aggregation. I then devote a section each examining the payoff to aggregation, the probability of capturing the payoff in parliamentary systems, the probability in presidential systems, and finally the effect of social heterogeneity on aggregation. In each of these sections, I derive a set of hypotheses from the theory outlined in Chapter 2, discuss my strategy for operationalizing the various explanatory (and control) variables of interest, describe the dataset used to test the hypotheses, and finally present the results of those tests. The final section concludes.

THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE: AGGREGATION AS INFLATION

As discussed in Chapter 1, the national party system is the product of two types of coordination – intra-district coordination and aggregation. Simply using the effective number of electoral parties in legislative elections is insufficient.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine you are a political entrepreneur seeking political power in pursuit of some goal. This could include everything from pursuing personal enrichment, to protecting or advancing the interests of a certain group, to implementing your preferred set of programmatic policies. As discussed in the last chapter, there are many reasons why, in a modern democracy, a political party would most likely be your vehicle for seeking political power in pursuit of that goal. But what factors dictate the kind of party you choose to join or organize? Specifically, when would you want to join or form a large, national party, and when might you be content with belonging to a smaller organization? These are the questions I seek to answer in this chapter.

To answer these questions, I focus on the incentives of two types of actors – first, political entrepreneurs or nascent party leaders, and second, candidates for the national legislature. Political entrepreneurs can come of in a variety of types – they might be the leader of the political group or faction, the leader of a small or medium-sized political party, or a notable figure looking to enter politics. The distinguishing feature of these entrepreneurs is their goal to capture some share of national executive authority via their position as head of a political party.

INTRODUCTION

In the previous two chapters, I developed and tested a theory of aggregation incentives. In the next three chapters, I use the theory to help explain the nature of party system development in Thailand and the Philippines. As discussed in the introduction, Thailand and the Philippines provide interesting variations on both the dependent and independent variables, which allow me to further investigate the causal mechanisms lying between the explanatory variables of interest (the size of the aggregation payoff and probability of capturing that prize) and the outcome of interest – the degree of aggregation. Even though elections in each country have often produced a comparatively large number of parties at the national level, aggregation has generally been much better in the Philippines vis-à-vis Thailand. In the following three chapters, I first describe the nature of intra-district and cross-district coordination in Thailand and the Philippines, utilizing unique datasets of district-level electoral returns in each country. Then, using the theory described in Chapter 2, I explain why the party system in each country looks as it does. In so doing, I answer the question of why, given similar majoritarian electoral institutions, there has until recently been more parties in Thailand than in the Philippines. Finally, I utilize episodes of institutional reform in each country to conduct comparative statics tests of the theory.

INTRODUCTION

In many respects, the party systems of Thailand and the Philippines look very similar. In both countries, party labels have historically been weak, party switching is rampant, and party cohesion is low. Where Thailand and the Philippines diverge is in the number of parties at the national level. Recall that in Thailand the average effective number of parties nationally prior to constitutional reform was 7.2. The corresponding figure for the Philippines over the course of its democratic history is a more modest 2.6. However, as in Thailand, there is substantial variation over time in the number of parties. Specifically, in the democratic period before martial law the effective number of parties at the national level averaged 2.3. After the fall of Marcos, the number of parties increased to 3.6 on average. Why this large increase? The inflation of the party system post-Marcos has long been a puzzle for scholars of Philippine politics, and this chapter provides an answer to that puzzle that is superior to existing explanations. How, too, do we explain the differences in the size of the Philippine and Thai party systems? Drawing on the theory from Chapter 2, I explain, first, why the post-Marcos party system has been much larger than the pre–martial law party system and, second, why cross-district coordination differs across the two countries. I demonstrate that differences in the number of parties between Thailand and the Philippines are primarily a product of aggregation and not variations in the two countries' electoral systems.

This concluding chapter is divided into two parts. In the first section, I summarize the central arguments and findings. In the second section, I identify some of the questions that still remain to be answered and offer some preliminary thoughts on the implications of various levels of aggregation for policymaking processes and outcomes.

SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS

In this book, I have focused on two dimensions of a country's party system – the number of parties and the degree of the nationalization. I have attempted to broaden the debate beyond the behavior of voters, candidates, and parties within electoral districts to include a focus the coordination of such actors across districts. I argued that aggregation is a key determinant of both the size of the party system and the degree of nationalization. Thus it is important to understand what factors shape the degree of aggregation.

The causal logic of my argument was grounded in the incentives of party entrepreneurs and candidates for political office. Aggregation is a function of the incentives these actors face to ally across districts under a common party banner. These incentives, in turn, are shaped by (1) the potential payoff for aggregation and (2) the probability of capturing that payoff. The incentives for coordinating across districts increase as the rewards for such coordination rise and the degree of uncertainty about capturing that reward falls.

INTRODUCTION

What does the theory of aggregation incentives as described in Chapter 2 tell us about the roots of cross-district coordination failures in pre-1997 Thailand? Why was aggregation so poor? Drawing on the theory presented in Chapter 2, I argue that poor aggregation incentives in Thailand reflected a diffusion of power within the national government (due to party factionalism and an appointed Senate) and uncertainty over the procedure for selecting the prime minister. In short, the expected utility associated with being the largest party in parliament was relatively low in pre-1997 Thailand. This discouraged greater attempts at cross-district coordination. I also discuss and evaluate possible alternative explanations (i.e., social heterogeneity and regionalism). I then devote the rest of the chapter to analyzing the effects of constitutional reform in light of the theory. Since the new Thai constitution and electoral system adopted in 1997 altered some of the variables I claim help shape aggregation incentives, this episode of institutional reform is an ideal opportunity for the use of comparative statics. In short, the constitutional reforms present me with a natural experiment that I can use to test the predictive power of the theory. The theory helps explain how and why the Thai party system has changed since the constitutional reforms. Specifically, I show that improvements in the aggregation payoff resulting primarily from new tools to combat party factionalism contributed to a dramatic improvement in cross-district coordination and an accompanying fall in the effective number of electoral parties.

INTRODUCTION

This book answers the question of why a party system with a modest number of nationally oriented political parties emerges in some democracies but not others. This question is of considerable importance given the staggering number of countries struggling with democratic consolidation in the wake of the so-called third wave of democratization. The question of how and why certain party systems emerge is equally relevant for a number of older democracies where perceived weaknesses in existing party systems have generated proposals for political-institutional reform (e.g. Great Britain, Italy, and Japan). As E. E. Schattschneider argued more than sixty years ago, the party system is in many ways the keystone of any effort to construct a well-functioning democracy (1942). Yet among the numerous tasks involved in the transition to and consolidation of democracy, the building of an effective and supportive party system has arguably proved the most difficult and elusive. Indeed, the sentiment of the Thai politician quoted above would resonate in many democracies across the globe, whether developing or developed (see Carothers 2006).

If an enduring and effective party system is a necessary condition for an enduring and effective democracy, it is essential that we understand how and why such party systems develop (or fail to develop).