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    • Publisher:
      Cambridge University Press
      Publication date:
      16 June 2021
      15 July 2021
      ISBN:
      9781108588300
      9781108706636
      DOI:
      https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108588300
      Dimensions:
      Weight & Pages:
      Dimensions:
      (229 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.16kg, 100 Pages
      • Subjects:
      Philosophy of Science, Philosophy
      Series:
      Elements in the Philosophy of Science
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    Subjects:
    Philosophy of Science, Philosophy
    Series:
    Elements in the Philosophy of Science
    Information

    Book description

    This Element provides an accessible introduction to the contemporary philosophy of causation. It introduces the reader to central concepts and distinctions (type vs token causation, probabilistic vs deterministic causation, difference-making, interventions, overdetermination, pre-emption) and to key tools (structural equations, graphs, probabilistic causal models) drawn upon in the contemporary debate. The aim is to fuel the reader's interest in causation, and to equip them with the resources to contribute to the debate themselves. The discussion is historically informed and outward-looking. 'Historically informed' in that concise accounts of key historical contributions to the understanding of causation set the stage for an examination of the latest research. 'Outward looking' in that illustrations are provided of how the philosophy of causation relates to issues in the sciences, law, and elsewhere. The aim is to show why the study of causation is of critical importance, besides being fascinating in its own right.

    References

    References

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