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    Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter 2018. Public choice and political science: a view from Europe. Public Choice, Vol. 175, Issue. 3-4, p. 245.

    Salter, Alexander William and Wagner, Richard E. 2018. Political entrepreneurship, emergent dynamics, and constitutional politics. Review of Social Economy, p. 1.

    Gill, Anthony 2017. Christian Democracy without Romance: The Perils of Religious Politics from a Public Choice Perspective. Perspectives on Political Science, Vol. 46, Issue. 1, p. 35.

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    Choosing in Groups
    • Online ISBN: 9781107707153
    • Book DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107707153
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Book description

This book is an introduction to the logic and analytics of group choice. To understand how political institutions work, it is important to isolate what citizens - as individuals and as members of society - actually want. This book develops a means of 'representing' the preferences of citizens so that institutions can be studied more carefully. This is the first book to integrate the classical problem of constitutions with modern spatial theory, connecting Aristotle and Montesquieu with Arrow and Buchanan.

Reviews

‘This is a substantially revised version of Melvin Hinich and Michael Munger’s 1997 book, Analytical Politics. With new and updated discussions, as well as material not covered in the previous publication, this book will be a useful tool to teach undergraduate courses on the topic of social choice.’

Carles Boix - Princeton University

‘I have repeatedly assigned Hinich and Munger’s volume in both undergraduate and graduate courses that introduce students to rational choice, game theory, and contemporary political thought. This new version handles spatial voting models extremely well and adds much more that wasn’t covered previously. The authors’ work is careful and deep, illustrating that they have gone to great lengths to add substantive content while making the book more accessible to a broader audience. This is a fantastic book.’

Keith L. Dougherty - University of Georgia

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