Contents

pp v-vi

List of key people

pp vii-xiv

List of acronyms

pp xv-xvi

Introduction

pp xvii-xx

Part 1 - You Can't Build Submarines in Australia

pp 1-2

1 - ‘The one class of vessel that it is impossible to build in Australia’: Australia's early submarines

pp 3-10

2 - Australia's Oberon class submarines

pp 11-19

3 - The submarine weapons update program and the origins of the new submarine project

pp 20-29

4 - The new submarine project

pp 30-36

5 - ‘We can't build submarines, go away’: Eglo Engineering and the submarine project

pp 37-43

6 - The acts of the apostles

pp 44-57

7 - ‘But how will you judge them?’: the tender evaluation process 1984–85

pp 58-75

8 - Spies, leaks and sackings: from tender evaluation to project definition study

pp 76-88

9 - The project definition study 1985–86

pp 89-100

10 - Debating the laws of physics: picking winners 1987

pp 101-116

Part 2 - The Honeymoon Years 1987–92

pp 117-118

11 - ‘Keen as mustard to do a good job’: setting to work 1987–89

pp 119-129

12 - Designing the Collins class

pp 130-141

13 - Building submarines

pp 142-151

14 - The automated integrated vision

pp 152-165

15 - Steel, sonars and tiles: early technological support for the submarines

pp 166-180

16 - ‘On time and on budget’

pp 181-190

Part 3 - ‘A Strange Sense of Unease” 1993–98

pp 191-192

17 - End of the honeymoon

pp 193-204

18 - The trials of Collins

pp 205-220

19 - ‘They were problems we didn't expect”

pp 221-234

20 - The role of Defence Science: noise and diesels

pp 235-243

21 - ‘A patch on this and chewing gum on that’: the combat system 1993–97

pp 244-254

Part 4 - Resolution

pp 255-256