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  • Cited by 8
  • Cited by
    This book has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Kroeker, Esther Engels 2015. Thomas Reid Today. Journal of Scottish Philosophy, Vol. 13, Issue. 2, p. 95.


    Fischer, Robert William 2014. Why it doesn’t matter whether the virtues are truth-conducive. Synthese, Vol. 191, Issue. 6, p. 1059.


    Sankey, Howard 2014. Relativism, Particularism and Reflective Equilibrium. Journal for General Philosophy of Science, Vol. 45, Issue. 2, p. 281.


    Pickavance, Timothy 2011. Skeptics Can Win (But Almost Never Will). Philosophical Papers, Vol. 40, Issue. 3, p. 371.


    Rysiew, Patrick 2011. Reid's First Principle #7. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 41, Issue. sup1, p. 167.


    Sankey, Howard 2010. Witchcraft, Relativism and the Problem of the Criterion. Erkenntnis, Vol. 72, Issue. 1, p. 1.


    Baumann, Peter 2009. Was Moore a Moorean? On Moore and Scepticism. European Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 17, Issue. 2, p. 181.


    Kelly, Thomas 2005. Moorean Facts and Belief Revision, or Can the Skeptic Win?. Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 19, Issue. 1, p. 179.


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    Common Sense
    • Online ISBN: 9780511498800
    • Book DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511498800
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Book description

In this 2004 book, Noah Lemos presents a strong defense of the common sense tradition, the view that we may take as data for philosophical inquiry many of the things we ordinarily think we know. He discusses the main features of that tradition as expounded by Thomas Reid, G. E. Moore and Roderick Chisholm. For a long time common sense philosophers have been subject to two main objections: that they fail to give any non-circular argument for the reliability of memory and perception; and that they pick out instances of knowledge without knowing a criterion for knowledge. Lemos defends the appeal to what we ordinarily think we know in both epistemology and ethics and thus rejects the charge that common sense is dogmatic, unphilosophical or question-begging. Written in a clear and engaging style, this book will appeal to students and philosophers in epistemology and ethics.

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This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.


William Alston Two Types of Foundationalism.” The Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976): 165–85

Tyler Burge . “Content Preservation.” Philosophical Review 102 (1993): 457–88

Earl Conee . “Comments on Bill Lycan's ‘Moore Against the New Skeptics’.” Philosophical Studies 103 (2001): 55–59

Jerold Katz . “What Mathematical Knowledge Could Be.” Mind 104 (1995): 491–524

William Lycan . “Moore Against the New Skeptics.” Philosophical Studies 103 (2001): 35–53

Paul Moser Epistemological Fission.” The Monist 81 (1998): 353–70

Walter Sinnot-Armstrong . “Begging the Question.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (1999): 174–91

Donna Summerfield . “Modest a Priori Knowledge.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1991): 39–66

Jonathan Vogel . “Reliabilism Leveled.” The Journal of Philosophy (2000): 602–25

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