Comparative Constitutional Design

doi:10.1017/CBO9781139105712

This volume brings together essays by many of the leading scholars of comparative constitutional design from many perspectives to collectively assess what we know - and do not know - about the design process as well as particular institutional choices concerning executive power, constitutional amendment processes and many other issues. Bringing together positive and normative analysis, this volume provides state of the art in a field of growing theoretical and practical importance.

'The combination of theoretical and empirical essays will further develop comparative constitutional design as an important perspective and project within comparative constitutional studies.'

Source: International Journal of Constitutional Law

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Contents

Comparative Constitutional Design - Half title page
pp i-ii
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Comparative Constitutional Design - Title page
pp iii-iii
- By Tom Ginsburg
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Copyright page
pp iv-iv
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Contents
pp v-vi
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Figures
pp vii-vii
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Tables
pp viii-viii
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Contributors
pp ix-x
- By Susan Alberts, Tamar Asadurian, Justin Blount, Anjali Thomas Bohlken, Robert D. Cooter, Rosalind Dixon, Zachary Elkins, Jon Elster, John Ferejohn, Tom Ginsburg, Ran Hirschl, Richard Holden, James Melton, Martha C. Nussbaum, Pasquale Pasquino, Randall Peerenboom, Eric A. Posner, Adam Przeworski, Neil S. Siegel, Adrian Vermeule, Chris Warshaw, Barry R. Weingast
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Acknowledgments
pp xi-xii
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1 - Introduction
pp 1-12
- By Tom Ginsburg
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Part I - Design Processes
pp 13-66
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2 - Clearing and Strengthening the Channels of Constitution Making
pp 15-30
- By Jon Elster
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3 - Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter?
pp 31-66
- By Justin Blount, Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg
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Part II - How Do We Get to Constitutional Design? Constraints and Conditions
pp 67-192
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4 - Democratization and Countermajoritarian Institutions Power and Constitutional Design in Self-Enforcing Democracy
pp 69-100
- By Alberts Susan, Chris Warshaw, Barry R. Weingast
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5 - The Origins of Parliamentary Responsibility
pp 101-137
- By Adam Przeworski, Tamar Asadurian, Anjali Thomas Bohlken
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6 - Social Foundations of China’s Living Constitution
pp 138-163
- By Randall Peerenboom
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7 - The Political Economy of Constitutionalism in a Non-Secularist World
pp 164-192
- By Ran Hirschl
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Part III - Issues in Institutional Design
pp 193-380
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8 - Constitutional Amendment Rules
pp 195-218
The Denominator Problem
- By Rosalind Dixon, Richard Holden
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9 - Collective-Action Federalism
pp 219-265
A General Theory of Article I, Section 8
- By Robert D. Cooter, Neil S. Siegel
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10 - Personal Laws and Equality
pp 266-293
The Case of India
- By Martha C. Nussbaum
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11 - Constitutional Adjudication, Italian Style
pp 294-316
- By John Ferejohn, Pasquale Pasquino
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12 - Tyrannophobia
pp 317-349
- By Eric A. Posner, Adrian Vermeule
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13 - Do Executive Term Limits Cause Constitutional Crises?
pp 350-380
- By Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins, James Melton
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Index
pp 381-393
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Comparative Constitutional Design

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Contents

Comparative Constitutional Design - Half title page
pp i-ii

Comparative Constitutional Design - Title page
pp iii-iii

Copyright page
pp iv-iv

Contents
pp v-vi

Figures
pp vii-vii

Tables
pp viii-viii

Contributors
pp ix-x

Acknowledgments
pp xi-xii

1 - Introduction
pp 1-12

Part I - Design Processes
pp 13-66

2 - Clearing and Strengthening the Channels of Constitution Making
pp 15-30

3 - Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter?
pp 31-66

Part II - How Do We Get to Constitutional Design? Constraints and Conditions
pp 67-192

4 - Democratization and Countermajoritarian Institutions Power and Constitutional Design in Self-Enforcing Democracy
pp 69-100

5 - The Origins of Parliamentary Responsibility
pp 101-137

6 - Social Foundations of China’s Living Constitution
pp 138-163

7 - The Political Economy of Constitutionalism in a Non-Secularist World
pp 164-192

Part III - Issues in Institutional Design
pp 193-380

8 - Constitutional Amendment Rules
pp 195-218

9 - Collective-Action Federalism
pp 219-265

10 - Personal Laws and Equality
pp 266-293

11 - Constitutional Adjudication, Italian Style
pp 294-316

12 - Tyrannophobia
pp 317-349

13 - Do Executive Term Limits Cause Constitutional Crises?
pp 350-380

Index
pp 381-393

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Comparative Constitutional Design

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