The discourse of Somalia in academic literature portends that it has been conflict-ridden for a generation (forty years). This notion applies specifically to South-Central Somalia where an average of 5,000 conflict-related deaths were recorded between 2021 and 2022 (Acled, 2023). The northern regions of Puntland and Somaliland that were once ravaged by the same conflict have developed indigenous modes of conflict resolution and governance that have been effective since the 1990s and achieved some degree of stability and security. Unfortunately, the South-Central region has been unable to replicate this success story and this book examines the reasons for this. The forces behind South Somalia's current crisis are mainly external actors consisting of its neighbours Ethiopia, the African Union (AU) and the major powers of the west that set the parameters for global norms (Kyriakiakidis, 2012). These norms are hoisted on other regions of the world irrespective of historical experience, culture and social dynamics. Organisations involved in conflict management, the AU inclusive, keep with these rules. With the dependence of the AU on its western benefactors, it is difficult for the AU to carry out its task of providing security without first protecting and promoting these western interests. The intervention in Somalia that escalated and prolonged the crisis in the south-central region was borne out of this relationship between the AU and its benefactors. Sadly, the western narrative on the necessity of AU intervention in Somalia has dominated conflict literature, while that of the effective alternative approaches embodied in the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) remained unpopular. Unfortunately too, the writings of the greater number of African scholars pander to this dominant narrative.

Contrary to the dominant narrative peddled by the global media, this book adopts a Pan-African problem-solving approach, hinged on the ‘problems of a single story’ thesis, and questions the rationale behind the AU's peace enforcement in Somalia? What justification for intervention can be given in view of the fact that a viable political alternative espoused in the ICU, existed at the time? What are the prospects for the future of (South-Central) Somalia? How can the AU and its partners retrace their steps or foster peace in Somalia?

Introduction

In our everyday lives, especially for adults, there is the need to be up to date with news in our communities, the larger society and the world. Beyond the need to know, there is the awareness that events that occur near or far away could have profound effects on our lives. This makes dependence on information outlets and the information media indispensable in our lives as we believe that what we hear is true and plan accordingly. There is the belief all over the world that what is conveyed into living rooms over tv and radio sets is true, and these fashion opinions, views, beliefs and convictions. This happens all over the world which implies that the power of the global media is massive as it shapes minds and convictions. When this force serves the parochial interests of states, rather than the facts as they really are, what happens? Do the news corporations ever think of the public trust vested in them, and the need to live up to that trust and present the facts as they are? If they did, would there ever be the issue of the ‘fake news’ phenomenon? How much damage does this do? Does the end justify the subversion of facts? Do citizens query the content of what they hear (or are tired of querying)?

Molina et al. (2021) acknowledge that information distortion, which has been popularly termed fake news, has become a scourge that has plagued the information environment. They identify misreporting, commentary and persuasive information among the distortion of information. Zheng and Almeida (2021) contend that it consists of plain deception and political rumour peddling. However, information distortion is conceived and employed as a political, conflict or security strategy, they have far-reaching and sometimes dire implications.

In Somalia, this strategy was adopted to pave the way for the usurpation of the authority of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU; Hull & Svensson, 2008; Cocodia, 2021). The usurpation drew its momentum from the stigmatisation of Islam (Islamophobia) and its link to terrorism and securitisation as conceived in the west (Kaya, 2011; Smith, 2016; Solomon & Cocodia, 2021; Mokoena, 2022).

Introduction

In November 2023, I concluded the manuscript of this book, which I started in early 2022. At the time of beginning the project, the region of northern Somalia was peaceful and served as a perfect example for my argument. On submitting my finished draft to the publishers, one of several book reviewers drew my attention to the crisis that had embroiled Somaliland and Puntland. The conflict was tearing the region apart as deaths and the number of internally displaced persons swelled. The reviewer noted that it would give this book greater relevance to capture these recent events. This review comment prompted this section. However, the essence of the previous chapters and the argument made therein were to show the folly of the AU, its lack of belief in its own dictum, and how its dependence on external actors has kept it hind-sighted in its handling of conflict on the continent. The conflict in Somalia was perfect in telling explaining this. The stability in Somaliland was used to show what African States can achieve on their own, and in which case, some support from a focussed and truly Pan-African AU would help such indigenous causes. As far as this argument goes, it was a job done with the preceding chapters of this book. The recent conflict in Somalia's northern region falls outside the original scope of this book, but in order to bring this book up to date, this section has been added to briefly discuss this conflict and what it means for the recommendations already made.

Bad Policies and Political Hind-sightedness: The Conf lict of the Northern Regions

Somaliland, in seceding from Somalia, laid claim to the area of British Somaliland in the north before its merger with Italian Somaliland in the south in 1960 into what today is Somalia. Unfortunately, the Dhulbahante who are a subgroup of the Darod clan in Puntland, and who inhabit the border areas of Sool and Sanaag claimed by Somaliland do not share the secession objective of the Isaaq clan who are the dominant group in Somaliland. This became the cause of friction that blew into full-scale conflict.

Introduction

The AU has systematically drawn down its forces in Somalia, which is an indication they cannot be there forever. The increasing number of conservative right-wing leaders in the west and schisms such as Brexit does not bode well for the AU's long-term presence in Somalia. So what has to be done for long-term stability in Somalia should be done now. There is a lot to learn from the country's autonomous northern regions considering that Somalis are one people, with one language, one dominant religion (Sunni Islam) and shared cultural experience. It is logical therefore to argue that what works for the regions of the north will work for the regions of the south. The stability achieved during the short-lived ingenious administration of the ICU strongly supports this view. All that was needed was to make this indigenous approach more enduring through international support. Systems of government are more effective when they evolve from the experience of the people they are meant to serve.

While southern and central Somalia still remain conflict-ridden, the northern part of the country devoid of AU occupation has long since experienced some semblance of stability. The autonomous regions of the north devolved a system of governance unique to their experience and being spared external interference, these regions have been fairly stable. This decent example shows the workability of indigenous governance in Africa and an independent AU should have invested its resources into encouraging such indigenous political models all over Somalia rather than disrupt them at the insistence of its benefactors.

In the northwest and northeast of Somalia, the collapse of the central government did not precipitate the kind of warfare and plunder that initially devastated the south. For a variety of reasons, such as greater political cohesion among clans, local ownership, more support from businessmen to support the peace, effective political leadership and innovation rooted in tradition, these areas spared themselves intense violence. The self-declared state of Somaliland gradually began to build modes of capacity to govern, and a national assembly of traditional clan elders helped to manage the peace and keep young gunmen under control. In Puntland in the north-east, chronic inter-clan tensions were contained by traditional elders as well.

My first encounter with Somalis was in the early 1990s. What struck me was their hospitality, they were quick to smile and to lend a helping hand should one need it. Somali warmth was indeed legendary. Despite being a stranger in the midst, I was invited as an honoured wedding guest and shared meals with families I was just introduced to. I was appalled, then, when the country descended into a bloody civil war. For the past forty years, South-Central Somalia has been engulfed in violence between clans, an Islamist insurrection in the form of Al-Shabaab and the Machiavellian antics of political elites in Mogadishu whose sole purpose was to ensure that they were as closely positioned to the feeding trough of a failed state.

This spiral to hell and mayhem continued apace whilst the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) kept having its mandate extended. This raises the important question as to why Somalia's northern regions of Puntland and Somaliland have remained relatively unscathed by the violence. It is here where Jude Cocodia in the book goes against the grain of mainstream scholarship on Somalia. Courageously and innovatively, he has provided an alternative explanation to the Somali imbroglio. Erudite and fearlessly, Cocodia notes how both Puntland and Somaliland have made use of indigenous modes of conflict resolution and governance. As these were not deemed alien to their peoples’ values, they resonated with them and allowed them to create relatively stable polities. In the process, both Puntland and Somaliland have challenged the Eurocentric underpinnings of state formation contained in the Westphalian order.

State formation in southern Somalia, sadly did not go this route. Indeed, following the ouster of the dictatorship of Siad Barre, there emerged the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). As practically all Somalis are Muslim, the ICU was formed to prevent inter and intra-clan conflict through Islamic principles. However, Ethiopia, the seat of the African Union, did not want this to occur. Addis Ababa, already occupied a large portion of Somalia, the Ogaden and a united Somalia may well press claims for the return of Ogaden. So, Ethiopia had a vested interest in not seeing a stable and strong Somalia.

Africa has been at the receiving end of international politics since the start of the AD era. The muslim invasion and conquest of North Africa in the seventh century (642 AD–648 AD) changed traditional and budding Christian cultures to Islam (Speel II, 2009 Brett, 2008; Gearon, 2011; Nmah, 2018; Cartwright, 2019; Wilkin, 2022; Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2023). The growth of the trans-Saharan trade 650 AD–1500 AD fortified these (sometimes repressive) changes (Wright, 2007; Harich et al, 2010; Kanu, 2013), along with the Trans-Atlantic slave trades (Lovejoy, 1989; M’baye, 2007, then the later part that ushered colonialism and its neo-colonial spin-off (Onebunne, 2017; Chowdhury & Sundaram, 2022). All these point to the fact that for close to two thousand years, other races, cultures and ideologies took charge of African affairs such that the continent had no voice of its own, could not decide for itself and had no choice other than to actualise the interest of other regions, races and interests. It was as though, the continent lacked a goal, an agenda of its own. Scholarship in Africa has not been spared this deficit as the majority of discourses tow the dominant narratives. Chimamanda Adichie (2009) termed this phenomenon the dangers of a single story where Africans see the world and tell the continent's story from these dominant western perspectives. This research was based on this ‘Single Story thesis’ hence it X-rayed the sociopolitical deficits created by the dominant narratives on the continent and advocates that indigenous perspectives should be at the fore and more widespread, and local approaches should be developed to address these problems. Supporting this position, Ezekiel (2022) contends that, the narratives of Africa can be changed, not to forget history, but to reflect, learn lessons and develop local strategies to overcome re-occurrence in any form. This book was written to address one of many such single stories on the continent, and no place has such a story been more explicit than in Somalia.

Somalia has witnessed close to forty years of conflict of which its fractional colonial experience and failure of governance have been responsible. The adoption of traditional forms of governance brought the northern regions out of this chaos.

Introduction

Extant literature is scant on data on the involvement of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the African Union (AU) in Somalia's conflict prior to 2007 (see Muyangwa & Vogt, 2000). Since its inception in 2002, the AU had been quite torpid in Somalia's affairs until after Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia in 2006.. Efforts at resolving Somalia's crises diplomatically were championed by states or Regional Economic Communities (RECs) (Cocodia, 2021). The AU's involvement in Somalia's conflict really began with the operations of AMISOM. Adopting peace enforcement as the first course of action by an IGO in conflict resolution is unusual bearing in mind that diplomatic efforts that ought to preclude engagement were never undertaken by the AU. In discussions with an AU official in Addis Ababa on the conflict in Somalia in 2013, Al-Shabaab was referred to as ‘those terrorists bastards’. With such a view of the opposition within the corridors of the AU, it is easy to see why diplomacy was never considered an option. The approach of the AU to the crisis was well in consonance with the dominant narrative of Al-Shabaab being a terrorist group, so there was the need to flush them out for being so labelled. This approach of the AU indicates that it was partisan right from the start, rather than an objective intervener. Partisanship in conflict resolution never bodes well for mediation, arbitration or fostering the peace in whatever form. By virtue of this approach, the AU missed the opportunity of building on the stability won by the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) which was a golden chance for peace in Somalia.

Summary

From the AU's inception in 2002 to Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia in 2006, the AU stayed quite inactive in Somalia's affairs. Efforts at resolving the crisis diplomatically were championed by states or RECs. The AU involvement came at the insistence of the UN and the United States in 2007 for the organisation to take over the role of ‘regime changer’ from Ethiopia. The AU's involvement thus legitimised Ethiopia's invasion. The dominant narrative of the AU as a ‘peace enforcer’ has added colour to this usurpation and masked the intervention for what it truly was.