Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
  1. Home
  2. Books
  3. Compliance Quantified
  • Cited by 20
      • Show more authors
      • You may already have access via personal or institutional login
    • Select format
    • Publisher:
      Cambridge University Press
      Publication date:
      November 2009
      May 1996
      ISBN:
      9780511526510
      9780521553667
      9780521019194
      DOI:
      https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511526510
      Dimensions:
      (228 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.56kg, 272 Pages
      Dimensions:
      (228 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.386kg, 272 Pages
      • Subjects:
      Economics, Finance and Accountancy, Optimization, OR and risk, Statistics and Probability
    You may already have access via personal or institutional login
    • Selected: Digital
    Add to cart View cart Buy from Cambridge.org
    Subjects:
    Economics, Finance and Accountancy, Optimization, OR and risk, Statistics and Probability
    Information

    Book description

    International agreements, such as those governing arms control or the environment, virtually always require some degree of verification of information, in order that compliance can be established. To ensure that the verification process can be regarded as efficient, effective and impartial, it is important to have a mathematical model of it. One can be derived by applying methods from statistics and the theory of non-cooperative games, developed in part by John Nash, who received a Nobel prize in 1994 for his work. The methods permit the development of rational verification strategies, as well as such fundamental concepts as guaranteed probability of detection, timeliness of inspections and the deterrence of illegal activity. In this 1996 book, the required theory is introduced gradually in the context of specific real-world examples. The only prerequisites are simple calculus and statistics, so the book should be accessible to a broad range of scientists and non-scientists, in industrial, academic or governmental environments.

    Reviews

    "This is a well written, thorough and unique book, discussing some statistical aspects of verifying compliance with arms control treaties....The approach has a very strong game-theoretic element....I would recommend the book for use either as a reference or as a training aid for those working on compliance activities, either in arms control or in environmental monitoring." Mayrice C. Bryson, The Journal of the American Statistical Association

    Refine List

    Actions for selected content:

    Select all | Deselect all
    • View selected items
    • Export citations
    • Download PDF (zip)
    • Save to Kindle
    • Save to Dropbox
    • Save to Google Drive

    Save Search

    You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

    Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
    Cancel
    ×

    Contents

    Contents

    Metrics

    Full text views

    Total number of HTML views: 0
    Total number of PDF views: 0 *
    Loading metrics...

    Book summary page views

    Total views: 0 *
    Loading metrics...

    * Views captured on Cambridge Core between #date#. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

    Usage data cannot currently be displayed.

    Accessibility standard: Unknown

    Why this information is here

    This section outlines the accessibility features of this content - including support for screen readers, full keyboard navigation and high-contrast display options. This may not be relevant for you.

    Accessibility Information

    Accessibility compliance for the PDF of this book is currently unknown and may be updated in the future.