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    • Publisher:
      Cambridge University Press
      Publication date:
      22 May 2024
      20 June 2024
      ISBN:
      9781009303033
      9781009494533
      9781009303071
      Dimensions:
      (229 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.268kg, 90 Pages
      Dimensions:
      (229 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.15kg, 90 Pages
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    Book description

    Despite voters' distaste for corruption, corrupt politicians frequently get reelected. This Element provides a framework for understanding the conditions under which corrupt politicians are reelected. One unexplored source of electoral accountability is court rulings on candidate malfeasance, which are increasingly determining politicians' prospects. I find that (1) low-income voters – in contrast to higher income voters – are responsive to such rulings. Unlike earlier studies, we explore multiple tradeoffs voters weigh when confronting a corrupt candidate, including the candidate's party, policy positions, and personal attributes. The results also surprisingly show (2) low-income.

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