Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
  1. Home
  2. Books
  3. Debating Self-Knowledge
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
July 2012
Print publication year:
2012
Online ISBN:
9781139062114
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139062114
Subjects:
Epistemology and Metaphysics, Philosophy
Information

Book description

Language users ordinarily suppose that they know what thoughts their own utterances express. We can call this supposed knowledge minimal self-knowledge. But what does it come to? And do we actually have it? Anti-individualism implies that the thoughts which a person's utterances express are partly determined by facts about their social and physical environments. If anti-individualism is true, then there are some apparently coherent sceptical hypotheses that conflict with our supposition that we have minimal self-knowledge. In this book, Anthony Brueckner and Gary Ebbs debate how to characterize this problem and develop opposing views of what it shows. Their discussion is the only sustained, in-depth debate about anti-individualism, scepticism and knowledge of one's own thoughts, and will interest both scholars and graduate students in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and epistemology.

Reviews

'The Brueckner and Ebbs debate, about whether attitude anti-individualism threatens a subject's authority regarding her own thoughts, is a pleasure to read. This book is a must-read for all who followed the debate over the last decade, and the arguments presented here will also invigorate the debate going forward.'

Sanford Goldberg - Northwestern University

'I strongly recommend Brueckner and Ebbs’s book to anyone interested in self-knowledge. It is a valuable contribution both in its overall argument and in its specific discussions.'

George Lăzăroiu Source: Review of Contemporary Philosophy

Refine List

Actions for selected content:

Select all | Deselect all
  • View selected items
  • Export citations
  • Download PDF (zip)
  • Save to Kindle
  • Save to Dropbox
  • Save to Google Drive

Save Search

You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
Cancel
×

Contents

Contents
References

Bibliography

Papers by Brueckner and Ebbs that appear in this volume cite other papers of theirs that appear in the volume. These are listed in the Acknowledgements, and are not also included in the following list.

Austin, J. L. 1979. Other minds. In J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock, eds., Philosophical Papers, 3rd edn., Oxford University Press, pp. 76–116.
Bilgrami, Akeel. 1992. Can externalism be reconciled with self-knowledge?, Philosophical Topics 20: 223–267.
Boghossian, Paul. 1989. Content and self-knowledge. Philosophical Topics 17: 5–26.
Boghossian, Paul 1992. Externalism and inference. In E. Villanueva, ed., Rationality in Epistemology, Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview Publishing Co., pp. 11–28.
Brueckner, Anthony. 1984. Putnam’s model-theoretic argument against metaphysical realism. Analysis 44: 134–140.
Brueckner, Anthony 1985. Skepticism and epistemic closure. Philosophical Topics 13: 89–117. Reprinted in Essays on Skepticism.
Brueckner, Anthony 1990. Scepticism about knowledge of content. Mind 99: 447–451. Reprinted in Essays on Skepticism.
Brueckner, Anthony 1992a. Semantic answers to skepticism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73: 200–219. Reprinted in Essays on Skepticism.
Brueckner, Anthony 1992b. Genova, Davidson, and content scepticism. Analysis 52: 228–231.
Brueckner, Anthony 1994a. Knowledge of content and knowledge of the world. Philosophical Review 103: 327–343. Reprinted in Essays on Skepticism.
Brueckner, Anthony 1994b. The structure of the skeptical argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54: 827–35. Reprinted in Essays on Skepticism.
Brueckner, Anthony 2003. Two transcendental arguments concerning self-knowledge. In S. Nuccetelli, ed., New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, pp. 185–200.
Brueckner, Anthony 2010. Essays on Skepticism. Oxford University Press.
Burge, Tyler. 1979. Individualism and the mental. In P. A. French, T. E. Uehling, and H. K. Wettstein, eds., Midwest Studies in Philosophy Volume iv, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 73–122.
Burge, Tyler 1982a. Two thought experiments reviewed. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 32: 284–293.
Burge, Tyler 1982b. Other bodies. In A. Woodfield, ed., Thought and Object: Essays on Intentionality, Oxford University Press, pp. 97–120.
Burge, Tyler 1986. Cartesian error and the objectivity of perception. In P. Pettit and J. McDowell, eds., Subject, Thought, and Context, Oxford University Press.
Burge, Tyler 1988a. Individualism and self-knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 85: 649–663.
Burge, Tyler 1988b. Reply: authoritative self-knowledge and perceptual individualism. In R. Grim and D. Merril, eds., Contents of Thought, Tucson: University of Arizona Press.
Burge, Tyler 2003. Mental agency in authoritative self-knowledge: Reply to Kobes. In M. Hahn and B. Ramberg, eds., Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, pp. 417–433.
Burge, Tyler 2010. Origins of Objectivity. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Christensen, David. 1993. Skeptical problems, semantical solutions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53: 301–321.
Davidson, Donald. 1974. On the very idea of a conceptual scheme. In Donald Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 183–198.
Davidson, Donald 1984a. The method of truth metaphysics. In Donald Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 199–214.
Davidson, Donald 1984b. First-person authority. Dialectica 38: 101–111.
Davidson, Donald 1986. A coherence theory of truth and interpretation. In Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Blackwell.
Davidson, Donald 1987. Knowing one’s own mind. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60: 441–458.
Davidson, Donald 1988. Reply to Burge. Journal of Philosophy 85: 664–665.
Davidson, Donald 1991. Three varieties of knowledge. In A. Phillips Griffith, ed., A. J. Ayer: Memorial Essays, Cambridge University Press, pp. 153–166.
Dretske, Fred. 1970. Epistemic operators. Journal of Philosophy 67: 1007–1023.
Ebbs, Gary. 1992. Realism and rational inquiry. Philosophical Topics 20: 1–33.
Ebbs, Gary 1997. Rule-Following and Realism. Cambridge: Mass., Harvard University Press.
Ebbs, Gary 2003. A puzzle about doubt. In S. Nuccetelli, ed., New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, pp. 143–168.
Ebbs, Gary 2009. Truth and Words. Oxford University Press.
Eliot, T. S. 1963. Fragment of an agon. In Collected Poems: 1909–1962, 130–136. London: Faber and Faber Ltd.
Evans, Gareth. 1982. Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Falvey, Kevin and Owens, Joseph. 1994. Externalism, self-knowledge, and skepticism. Philosophical Review 103: 107–137.
Fodor, Jerry. Narrow meaning and content holism. Unpublished.
Fodor, Jerry 1982. Cognitive science and the twin-earth problem. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 32: 98–118.
Frankfurt, Harry. 1965. Descartes’ validation of reason. American Philosophical Quarterly 2: 149–156.
Gallois, André. 1992. Putnam, brains in vats, and arguments for skepticism. Mind 101: 273–286.
Genova, A. C. 1991. Craig on Davidson: a thumbnail refutation. Analysis 51: 195–198.
Heil, John. 1988. Privileged access. Mind 1988: 238–251.
Hill, Christopher S. 1990. Review of Subject, Thought, and Context, ed. P. Pettit and J. McDowell. Journal of Philosophy 87: 106–112.
Horwich, Paul. 1982. How to choose between empirically indistinguishable theories. Journal of Philosophy 79: 61–77.
Hylton, Peter. 1991–2. Translation, meaning, and self-knowledge. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91: 269–290.
Kaplan, David. 1989. Demonstratives. In J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein, eds., Themes from Kaplan, Oxford University Press, pp. 481–569.
Kripke, Saul. 1982. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Loar, Brian. 1988. Social content and pscyhological content. In R. Grimm and D. Merrill, eds., Contents of Thought, Tuscon: University of Arizona Press, pp. 99–110.
Malcolm, Norman. 1949. Defending common sense. Philosophical Review 58: 201–220.
Moore, G. E. 1959a. Four forms of skepticism. In G. E. Moore, Philosophical Papers, London: Allen and Unwin, pp. 196–225.
Moore, G. E. 1959b. Certainty. In G. E. Moore, Philosophical Papers, London: Allen and Unwin, pp. 226–251.
Moran, Richard. 2001. Authority and Estrangement: an Essay on Self-Knowledge. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press.
McIntyre, Jane. 1984. Putnam’s brains. Analysis 44: 59–61.
Nagel, Thomas. 1986. The View from Nowhere. Oxford University Press.
Nozick, Robert. 1981. Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Putnam, Hilary. 1962. The analytic and the synthetic. Reprinted in Hilary Putnam, Mind, Language, and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Vol. ii, Cambridge University Press, 1975, pp. 33–69. Originally published in Herber Feigl and Grover Maxwell, eds., Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. iii, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962.
Putnam, Hilary 1975. The meaning of ‘meaning’. In Hilary Putnam, Mind, Language, and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Vol. ii, Cambridge University Press, 1975, pp. 215–271.
Putnam, Hilary 1978. Realism and reason. In Hilary Putnam, Meaning and the Moral Sciences. Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Putnam, Hilary 1980. Models and reality. Journal of Symbolic Logic 44: 464–482.
Putnam, Hilary 1981. Reason, Truth, and History. Cambridge University Press.
Putnam, Hilary 1987. Truth and convention: on Davidson’s refutation of conceptual relativism. Dialectica 41: 69–77.
Putnam, Hilary 1988. Representation and Reality. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Putnam, Hilary 1989. Why is a Philosopher? In A. Cohen, and M. Dascal, eds., The Institution of Philosophy, La Salle, Ill.: Open Court.
Quine, W. V. 1940. Mathematical Logic. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Quine, W. V. 1960. Word and Object. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Searle, John R. 1987. Indeterminacy, empiricism, and the first person. Journal of Philosophy 84: 123–146.
Shoemaker, Sydney. 1988. On knowing one’s own mind. Philosophical Perspectives 2: 183–209.
Shoemaker, Sydney 1994. Self-knowledge and “inner sense.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54: 249–314.
Stalnaker, Robert. 1990. Narrow Content. In C. A. Anderson and J. Owens, eds., Propositional Attitudes, Chicago: CSLI Lecture Notes, pp. 131–145.
Stroud, Barry. 1984. The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Tymoczko, Thomas. 1989. In defense of Putnam’s brains. Philosophical Studies 57: 281–297.
Vogel, Jonathan. 2000. Reliabilism leveled. Journal of Philosophy 97: 602–623.
Vogel, Jonathan 2008. Epistemic bootstrapping. Journal of Philosophy 105: 518–39.
Williams, Bernard. 1978. Descartes: the Project of Pure Enquiry. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Williams, Michael. 1984. Review of Reason, Truth and History by Hilary Putnam. Journal of Philosophy 81: 257–261.
Williams, Michael 1988. Skepticism and charity, Ratio 12: 176–194.
Wright, Crispin. 1991. Scepticism and dreaming: imploding the demon. Mind 397: 87–116.
Wright, Crispin 2004. Warrant for nothing. Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 78: 167–212.

Metrics

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 0
Total number of PDF views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

Book summary page views

Total views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between #date#. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

Usage data cannot currently be displayed.