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    • Video Abstract: Elements in Epistemology: Deception and Self-Deception: Vladimir Krstić
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    • Publisher:
      Cambridge University Press
      Publication date:
      31 July 2025
      04 September 2025
      ISBN:
      9781009362887
      9781009509770
      9781009362894
      DOI:
      https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009362887
      Dimensions:
      (229 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.252kg, 80 Pages
      Dimensions:
      (229 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.13kg, 80 Pages
      • Subjects:
      Epistemology and Metaphysics, Philosophy: General Interest, Philosophy
      Series:
      Elements in Epistemology
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    Subjects:
    Epistemology and Metaphysics, Philosophy: General Interest, Philosophy
    Series:
    Elements in Epistemology
    Information

    Book description

    Received theories of self-deception are problematic. The traditional view, according to which self-deceivers intend to deceive themselves, generates paradoxes: you cannot deceive yourself intentionally because you know your own plans and intentions. Non-traditional views argue that self-deceivers act intentionally but deceive themselves unintentionally or that self-deception is not intentional at all. The non-traditional approaches do not generate paradoxes, but they entail that people can deceive themselves by accident or by mistake, which is controversial. The author argues that a functional analysis of deception solves these problems. On the functional view, a certain thing is deceptive if and only if its function is to mislead; hence, while (self-)deception may but need not be intended, it is never accidental or a mistake. Also, self-deceivers need not benefit from deception and they need not end up with epistemically unjustified beliefs; rather, they must 'not be themselves'. Finally, self-deception need not be adaptive.

    References

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