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    • Publisher:
      Cambridge University Press
      Publication date:
      19 October 2022
      10 November 2022
      ISBN:
      9781009092203
      9781009095136
      DOI:
      https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009092203
      Dimensions:
      Weight & Pages:
      Dimensions:
      (229 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.13kg, 74 Pages
      • Subjects:
      Epistemology and Metaphysics, Philosophy: General Interest, Philosophy
      Series:
      Elements in Epistemology
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    Subjects:
    Epistemology and Metaphysics, Philosophy: General Interest, Philosophy
    Series:
    Elements in Epistemology
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    Book description

    Post-Gettier epistemology is increasingly modalized epistemology – proposing and debating modally explicable conditionals with suitably epistemic content (an approach initially inspired by Robert Nozick's 1981 account of knowledge), as needing to be added to 'true belief' in order to define or understand knowing's nature. This Element asks whether such modalized attempts – construed as responding to what the author calls Knowing's Further Features question (bequeathed to us by the Meno and the Theaetetus) – can succeed. The answer is that they cannot. Plato's and Aristotle's views on definition reinforce that result. Still, in appreciating this, we might gain insight into knowing's essence. We might find that knowledge is, essentially, nothing more than true belief.

    References

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