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  3. Dispositions and Powers
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  • Cited by 23
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
March 2023
Print publication year:
2023
Online ISBN:
9781009118910
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009118910
Creative Commons:
Creative Common License - CC Creative Common License - BY Creative Common License - NC Creative Common License - ND
This content is Open Access and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 https://creativecommons.org/creativelicenses
Series:
Elements in Metaphysics
Subjects:
Epistemology and Metaphysics, Philosophy: General Interest, Philosophy
Information

Book description

As we understand them, dispositions are relatively uncontroversial 'predicatory' properties had by objects disposed in certain ways. By contrast, powers are hypothetical 'ontic' properties posited in order to explain dispositional behaviour. Chapter 1 outlines this distinction in more detail. Chapter 2 offers a summary of the issues surrounding analysis of dispositions and various strategies in contemporary literature to address them, including one of our own. Chapter 3 describes some of the important questions facing the metaphysics of powers including why they're worth positing, and how they might metaphysically explain laws of nature and modality. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

References

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