Contemporary technologies for offshore electricity generation and transmission enable sea uses of types and at scales that could not have been envisaged when the text of UNCLOS was agreed. The chapter considers whether UNCLOS is able to accommodate the offshore renewables revolution. It focuses on offshore wind energy, which is likely to see massive growth during the next three decades as the world decarbonizes. The review finds that UNCLOS does not always make adequate legal provision for them. Support will be needed from national laws, interstate agreements, and resolutions and guidelines of international organizations such as the International Maritime Organization to fill gaps in the law, clarify uncertainties and to meet challenges posed by offshore wind’s growth. Further regulation by states of offshore wind will also be needed to address the environmental effects of relevant development in line with duties for marine environmental protection, and to answer difficult legal questions raised by the pursuit of development that may itself cause significant environmental harm to address the environmental threats posed by climate change.

Small, mobile nuclear technology will power offshore oil gas and rigs, artificial islands and remote strategic areas. Russia has committed to deploying self-contained, low capacity, floating nuclear power plants (FNPPs) to meet the burgeoning energy needs of port cities in the Arctic region. Similarly, China is considering using FNPPs to power its outposts in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. Small modular reactors (SMRs) that are placed on board transportable nuclear power plants (TNPPs) are being developed to provide energy for military applications as well, including autonomous and unmanned vehicles. This chapter analyzes three types of TNPPS, their legal status and navigational rights under UNCLOS. It discusses the extent to which the global nuclear liability regime and UNCLOS apply to SMRs and TNPPs, and the different legal avenues that an injured state can seek, including remedies and attachment of liability to states that caused nuclear damage, even where the latter is not a party to any nuclear liability conventions.

Future naval and air forces will be comprised increasingly of unmanned and autonomous systems. Nearly 100 nations and nonstate actors currently operate unmanned and autonomous systems to support combat operations. These platforms have proven their ability to enhance situational awareness and improve mission performance. Unmanned systems will be used to augment manned platforms and will conduct missions that are considered dull, dirty and dangerous, thereby reducing risk to human life at a reduced cost. Introduction of these systems and vehicles will require states to modify how they characterize these platforms under international law as ships, warships, commercial aircraft and state aircraft to ensure that they are able to legally perform the missions that they have been designed to perform. This will require filling gaps in domestic and international law and regulations to better regulate and control the employment of these systems in the marine environment to ensure safety of navigation and overflight and protection of the marine environment.

Where the maritime claims of adjacent or opposite coastal states overlap with one another, a potential maritime boundary exists. Thanks to the extensions of maritime claims offshore, the number of potential maritime boundaries has substantially increased and only around half of potential maritime boundaries have been even partially settled. The role of technology in the evolution of maritime boundary delimitation is outlined. Emerging technologies, especially space-based infrastructure, are explored and found to have an increasingly important role to play in the determination of the location of the land/sea interface at the coast and thus the baselines from which equidistance lines are calculated as well as in terms of positioning technologies, allowing the realization of a coherent global geodetic reference system. The role of emerging technologies in the context of maritime boundary dispute resolution is also considered.

This chapter discusses the possible impact of blockchain or distributed ledger technology on private maritime law in the near to mid future. It suggests that tamperproof logs are likely to be relevant in four areas. These are (1) shipping documentation (especially negotiable documents of title); (2) payment in connection with letters of credit governed by the eUCP 2.0 and similar transactions; (3) cargo care and monitoring, especially in connection with claims between buyers and sellers, cargo claims against carriers, and possibly dangerous cargo suits against shippers; and (4) the monitoring of vessels themselves with a view to establishing the cause of casualties, a matter relevant in particular to charter disputes, insurance and collision claims. In all of these areas the use of distributed ledgers is likely to give rise to substantial savings in evidence-gathering and litigation costs, leading to the smoother and more efficient handling of claims.

The chapter proposes a novel interpretative account that functionally constructs the UNCLOS requirement of ship manning. The legal rationale underlying the argument in favor of functional flexibility is informed by the international regulatory developments at the level of the International Maritime Organization and considers that technological progress is best served by the emerging law-making philosophy of setting goal-based standards. The posited methodology further proposes that the functional interpretation of manning shall be linked to a test for reviewing the flag state margin of discretion in the context of the obligation to take measures toward achieving and maintaining comprehensive safety at sea for autonomous ships.

Hull inspection in the operational routine of commercial shipping is a regulatory obligation. This ensures seamless and smooth operations of commercial shipping vital to the global economy and the international supply chain. Failure to carry out these tasks may result in adverse consequences for the industry, leading to poor maintenance, poor performance and increased fuel consumption. In this era of digital advancement, service robots are integrated into the rudimentary manual inspection system. The systems are based on machine learning and capable of interacting with the environment to achieve preset goals and offer affordable and efficient alternatives. These advanced artificial intelligence–based alternatives are set to change the entire survey and maintenance landscape. While technological advancements continue, the regulatory governance side to these alternative technological solutions is gathering momentum and calls for a state-of-the-art analysis in light of the standardized requirements at play under the existing international regime.

Advances in long-range precision strike missiles, such as cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and hypersonic weapons, threaten the survivability of surface warships. In response, states are deploying submarines in the water column and expanding military activities on the seabed. Concepts such as “upward falling payloads” and networked “hydra” seabed installations envision prepositioned sensors and weapons emplaced on the continental shelf along an adversary’s coast. This chapter explores the legality of military operations on the continental shelf of a coastal state. The coastal state has sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the living and nonliving resources of the seabed and subsoil in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Foreign military activities are generally permissible on the continental shelf of a coastal state so long as they observe due regard for the resource rights of the coastal state. Coastal states enjoy the exclusive right to construct artificial islands on their continental shelf but they lack competence to regulate military seabed installations and structures on the continental shelf.

Artificial intelligence (AI) represents emerging technology with beneficial potential for the maritime domain, to contain all natural and manmade features, events, or activities appertaining to the seas, oceans or other navigable waterways. It is not a single technology but a continuum of capabilities designed to synergize computational processing power with human creativity. This chapter introduces key AI concepts, including but not limited to, algorithms, reinforcement learning, deep learning and artificial general intelligence. Science has not yet achieved sentient machines, and fully autonomous vessels may not become commonplace for a number of years; nevertheless, current AI technologies offer risk-reduction methodologies to human-crewed vessels operating in dynamic and often dangerous conditions. In general, AI can enhance compliance with the law of the sea and reduce marine casualties. Specifically, this chapter proposes that AI technologies should be adopted to facilitate safer navigation through improved hydrographic services and AI-supported decision-making for vessel masters and human crews at sea.

Marine bioprospecting is the examination of marine genetic material of plants, animals and microorganisms for features that may be of value for commercial purposes. These features may include chemical compounds, genes and their products, or, in some cases, the physical properties of the material in question. One of the principal attributes of bioprospection is the commercialization of the research or the intellectual property derived from the research on marine genetic resources (MGRs). This chapter explores the key challenges for an international treaty under UNCLOS governing access and use of MGRs in areas beyond national jurisdiction, including the deposit of material in biorepositories and mechanisms for sharing of knowledge from research on MGRs, such as a clearing house, and legal requirements for sharing data including gene sequence data and greater participation of researchers from developing countries. Reference is made to the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources and the 2010 Nagoya Protocol.

Technological advances have transformed shipping and global trade. The changed environment also includes increased vulnerability and electronic attacks targeting firms plying the high seas. The response to these challenges includes national action, multinational guidance and private-sector direction. The resulting array of authorities has produced an ad hoc approach to cybersecurity. Efforts at the International Maritime Organization include resolutions on cyber risk management. United States responses include policy, directives and law. The European Union has similarly promulgated extensive guidance on maritime cybersecurity. And, the private sector has developed guidelines to address maritime cyber challenges. Collaboration and the identification of authorities in this environment is crucial, yet no single model exists. This chapter chronicles the collection of efforts to protect electronic systems and networks in maritime cybersecurity, including an examination of a treaty used primarily for countering piracy that may offer crucial legal authority to prosecute illicit cyber activity. This chapter concludes with five recommendations to improve cooperation.