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    • Publisher:
      Cambridge University Press
      Publication date:
      06 July 2010
      08 June 1972
      ISBN:
      9780511735813
      9780521114776
      Dimensions:
      Weight & Pages:
      Dimensions:
      (216 x 140 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.27kg, 204 Pages
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    Book description

    A study in the philosophy of mind, centred on the problem of 'intentionality' the sense in which emotions can be said to have objects, their relation to these objects, and the implications of this relation for our understanding of human action and behaviour. Dr Wilson sets his enquiry against a broad historical background on what distinguishes man from inanimate objects by describing both Cartesian view of man is matter plus mind and the neo-Wittgensteinian view that there is a dynamic behavioural difference – causal notions being often inapplicable to human action. Dr Wilson goes on to show the controversies and arguments that arise from the notion of intentionality cannot be analysed in causal terms. Dr Wilson believes that this notion can be shown causally and sets out to prove it. Finally, he brings this argument to a larger context mentioning that it has far-reaching effects in natural and social sciences.

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    Contents

    • Frontmatter
      pp i-iv
    • Contents
      pp v-vi
    • Preface
      pp vii-viii
    • I - Introduction
      pp 1-7
    • II - Causal relations
      pp 8-17
    • III - Non-contingent relations
      pp 18-27
    • IV - Kenny's aims
      pp 28-37
    • V - Kenny's arguments
      pp 38-51
    • VI - Objects: delimitation of scope
      pp 52-59
    • VII - Objects: logico-grammatical criteria
      pp 60-69
    • VIII - Objects: two methods of approach
      pp 70-76
    • IX - Emotion and object: reactions to events
      pp 77-88
    • X - Emotion and object: the general conditions
      pp 89-95
    • XI - Emotion and object: some residual problems
      pp 96-102
    • XII - Immediacy and incorrigibility
      pp 103-112
    • XIII - First-person privilege
      pp 113-120
    • XIV - Attention and object
      pp 121-131
    • XV - Intentionality
      pp 132-140
    • XVI - Some interpretative problems
      pp 141-152
    • XVII - The extensional approach
      pp 153-162
    • XVIII - Syntactical ambiguity
      pp 163-176
    • XIX - Conclusion
      pp 177-189
    • Bibliography
      pp 190-191
    • Index
      pp 192-192

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