Skip to main content
×
Home
Evidence, Decision and Causality
  • Get access
    Check if you have access via personal or institutional login
  • Cited by 6
  • Cited by
    This book has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Bangu, Sorin 2017. Scientific explanation and understanding: unificationism reconsidered. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, Vol. 7, Issue. 1, p. 103.


    Elliott, Edward 2017. Probabilism, Representation Theorems, and Whether Deliberation Crowds Out Prediction. Erkenntnis, Vol. 82, Issue. 2, p. 379.


    Pérez Carballo, Alejandro 2016. Rationality & Second-Order Preferences. Noûs,


    Bales, Adam 2016. Richness and rationality: causal decision theory and the WAR argument. Synthese,


    Walker, Mark Thomas 2015. Rejoinder to Bermúdez on Lewis, Newcomb’s Problem and the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Philosophia, Vol. 43, Issue. 3, p. 795.


    Ahmed, Arif and Caulton, Adam 2014. Causal Decision Theory and EPR correlations. Synthese, Vol. 191, Issue. 18, p. 4315.


    ×
  • Export citation
  • Recommend to librarian
  • Recommend this book

    Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this book to your organisation's collection.

    Evidence, Decision and Causality
    • Online ISBN: 9781139107990
    • Book DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139107990
    Please enter your name
    Please enter a valid email address
    Who would you like to send this to? *
    ×
  • Buy the print book

Book description

Most philosophers agree that causal knowledge is essential to decision-making: agents should choose from the available options those that probably cause the outcomes that they want. This book argues against this theory and in favour of evidential or Bayesian decision theory, which emphasises the symptomatic value of options over their causal role. It examines a variety of settings, including economic theory, quantum mechanics and philosophical thought-experiments, where causal knowledge seems to make a practical difference. The arguments make novel use of machinery from other areas of philosophical inquiry, including first-person epistemology and the free will debate. The book also illustrates the applicability of decision theory itself to questions about the direction of time and the special epistemic status of agents.

Reviews

'… Ahmed's book on the debate between EDT and CDT is a very welcome addition to the literature in decision theory. It is a very subtle and finely crafted review of the principal points pertinent to an adjudication of the debate. Both sides of the debate have much to learn from Ahmed's precise formulation and thorough assessment of these points. He casts old arguments in new light and constructs new arguments with great ingenuity to produce a spirited defense of EDT. I heartily recommend this book to all decision theorists.'

Paul Weirich Source: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

    • Aa
    • Aa
Refine List
Actions for selected content:
Select all | Deselect all
  • View selected items
  • Export citations
  • Download PDF (zip)
  • Send to Kindle
  • Send to Dropbox
  • Send to Google Drive
  • Send content to

    To send content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to .

    To send content to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle.

    Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

    Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

    Please be advised that item(s) you selected are not available.
    You are about to send:
    ×

Save Search

You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
×

References

Ahmed, A. 2005. Evidential decision theory and medical Newcomb problems. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56: 191–8.
Ahmed, A. 2007. Agency and causation. In R. Corry and H. Price (eds.), Causation, Physics and the Constitution of Reality: Russell's Republic Revisited. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 120–55.
Ahmed, A. 2013. Causal Decision Theory: a counterexample. Philosophical Review 122: 289–306.
Allais, M. 1953. Le comportement de l'homme rationnel devant le risque: Critique des postulats et axiomes de l’école Américaine. Econometrica 21: 503–46.
Allison, H. E. 1990. Kant's Theory of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Anand, P. 1990. Two types of utility. Greek Economic Review 12: 58–74.
Anscombe, G. E. M. 1957. Intention. Oxford: Blackwell.
Arnett, J. J. 2000. Optimistic bias in adolescent and adult smokers and nonsmokers. Addictive Behaviours 25: 625–32.
Arntzenius, F. 2008. No regrets, or: Edith Piaf revamps decision theory. Erkenntnis 68: 277–97.
Arntzenius, F., A. Elga and J. Hawthorne. 2004. Bayesianism, infinite decisions and binding. Mind 113: 251–83.
Ayer, A. J. 1963. Fatalism. In his Concept of a Person and Other Essays. London: Macmillan: 235–68.
Bach, K. 1987. Newcomb's problem: the $1,000,000 solution. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17: 409–25.
Beebee, H. 2003. Local miracle compatibilism. Noûs 37: 258–77.
Beebee, H. and A. Mele. 2002. Humean compatibilism. Mind 442: 201–23.
Beebee, H. and D. Papineau. 1997. Probability as a guide to life. Journal of Philosophy 94: 217–43. Reprinted in D. Papineau, The Roots of Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003: 130–66.
Bell, J. S. 1964. On the Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen paradox. Physics 1: 195–200. Reprinted in his Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics. Revised edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004: 14–21.
Bell, J. S. 1981. Bertlmann's socks and the nature of reality. Journal de physique 42: C2 41–61. Reprinted in Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics. Revised edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004: 139–58.
Bell, J. S. 1985. The theory of local beables. Dialectica 39: 85–96. Reprinted in Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics. Revised edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004: 52–62.
Bell, J. S. 1990. La nouvelle cuisine. In A. Sarlemijn and P. Kroes (eds.), Between Science and Technology. Amsterdam: Elsevier: 97–115. Reprinted in Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics. Revised edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004: 323–48.
Bennett, J. 2003. A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Berkeley, G. 1980 [1710]. Principles of Human Knowledge. In his Philosophical Works, ed. M. Ayers. London: Everyman.
Berkovitz, J. 1995. Quantum nonlocality: an analysis of the implications of Bell's theorem and quantum correlations for nonlocality. Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge.
Bermudez, J. L. 2013. Prisoner's dilemma and Newcomb's problem: why Lewis's argument fails. Analysis 73: 423–9.
Binmore, K. 2009. Rational Decisions. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Black, M. 1956. Why cannot an effect precede its cause?Analysis 16: 49–58.
Blaylock, G. 2010. The EPR paradox, Bell's inequality, and the question of locality. American Journal of Physics 78: 111–20.
Bok, H. 1998. Freedom and Responsibility. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Bolker, E. 1967. A simultaneous axiomatization of utility and subjective probability. Philosophy of Science 34: 333–40.
Bovens, L. and S. Hartmann. 2003. Bayesian Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Broome, J. 1989. An economic Newcomb problem. Analysis 49: 220–2.
Broome, J. 1992. Review of McClennen, Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Ethics 102: 666–8.
Butterfield, J. 1992a. Bell's theorem: what it takes. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43: 41–83.
Butterfield, J. 1992b. David Lewis meets John Bell. Philosophy of Science 59: 26–42.
Cantwell, J. 2013. Conditionals in causal decision theory. Synthese 190: 661–79.
Cartwright, N. 1979. Causal laws and effective strategies. Noûs 13: 419–37.
Cartwright, N. 1999. Causal diversity and the Markov condition. Synthese 121: 3–127.
Cavalcanti, E. 2010. Causation, decision theory and Bell's theorem: a quantum analogue of the Newcomb problem. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61: 569–97.
Christensen, D. 2004. Putting Logic in Its Place. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chu, F. and J. Y. Halpern. 2004. Great expectations. Part II: generalized expected utility as a universal decision rule. Artificial Intelligence 159: 207–29.
Clark, M. 2007. Paradoxes from A to Z. 2nd edition. London: Routledge.
Clauser, J. F., M. A. Horne, A. Shimony and R. A. Holt. 1969. Proposed experiment to test local hidden-variable theories. Physical Review Letters 23: 880–4.
Collingwood, R. G. 1940. Essay on Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Craig, W. L. 1987. Divine foreknowledge and Newcomb's paradox. Philosophia 17: 331–50.
Davidson, D. 1971. Agency. In R. Brinkley, R. Bronaugh and A. Marras (eds.), Agent, Action and Reason. Toronto: University of Toronto Press: 3–25. Reprinted in his Essays on Actions and Events. 2nd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001: 43–61.
Dawes, R. M. 1990. The potential nonfalsity of the false consensus effect. In H. J. Einhorn and R. M. Hogarth (eds.), Insights in Decision Making: A Tribute to Hillel J. Einhorn. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press: 179–99.
Dougherty, T. 2011. On whether to prefer pain to pass. Ethics 121: 521–37.
Dougherty, T. 2013. A deluxe money pump. Thought. Online, available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/tht3.91/full.
Downs, A. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.
Dummett, M. A. E. 1959. Truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59: 141–62. Reprinted in his Truth and Other Enigmas. London: Duckworth, 1978: 1–24.
Dummett, M. A. E. 1964. Bringing about the past. Philosophical Review 73: 338–59. Reprinted in Truth and Other Enigmas. London: Duckworth, 1978: 333–50.
Dummett, M. A. E. 1986. Causal loops. In R. Flood and M. Lockwood (eds.), The Nature of Time. Oxford: Blackwell: 135–69. Reprinted in M. A. E. Dummett, The Seas of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993: 349–75.
Dummett, M. A. E. 1987. Reply toD. H. Mellor. In B. Taylor (ed.), Michael Dummett: Contributions to Philosophy. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff: 287–98.
Edgington, D. 1995. On conditionals. Mind 104: 235–329.
Edgington, D. 2004. Counterfactuals and the benefit of hindsight. In P. Dowe and P. Noordhof (eds.), Cause and Chance. London: Routledge: 12–27.
Edgington, D. 2011. Conditionals, causation and decision. Analytic Philosophy 52: 75–87.
Edgley, R. 1969. Reason in Theory and Practice. London: Hutchinson.
Eells, E. 1982. Rational Decision and Causality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Egan, A. 2007. Some counterexamples to Causal Decision Theory. Philosophical Review 116: 93–114.
Elga, A. 2007. Reflection and disagreement. Noûs 41: 478–502.
Evans, G. 1982. The Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fischer, J. M. 1994. The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fishburn, P. 1970. Utility Theory for Decision Making. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Flew, A. G. N. 1954. Can an effect precede its cause?Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 28: 47–62.
Forster, M. N. 2010. Wittgenstein on family resemblance concepts. In A. Ahmed (ed.), Wittgenstein's ‘Philosophical Investigations’: A Critical Guide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 66–87.
Frydman, R., G. P. O’Driscoll and A. Schotter. 1982. Rational expectations of government policy: an application of Newcomb's problem. Southern Economic Journal 1982: 311–19.
Gardner, M. 1974. Mathematical games. Scientific American 230: 102–9.
Gibbard, A. 1992. Weakly self-ratifying strategies: comments on McClennen. Philosophical Studies 65: 217–25.
Gibbard, A. and W. L. Harper. 1978. Counterfactuals and two kinds of expected utility. In C. Hooker, J. Leach and E. McClennen (eds.), Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory. Dordrecht: Riedel: 125–62. Reprinted in P. Gärdenfors and N.-E. Sahlin (eds.), Decision, Probability and Utility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988: 341–76.
Gilboa, I. 1999. Can free choice be known? In C. Bicchieri, R. Jeffrey and B. Skyrms (eds.), The Logic of Strategy. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 163–74.
Gilboa, I. 2009. Theory of Decision under Uncertainty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gilboa, I. and D. Schmeidler. 1989. Maxmin expected utility with a non-unique prior. Journal of Mathematical Economics 18: 141–53.
Glymour, C. 1980. Theory and Evidence. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Grafstein, R. 1991. An evidential decision theory of turnout. American Journal of Political Science 35: 989–1010.
Grafstein, R. 1999. Choice-Free Rationality: A Positive Theory of Political Behaviour. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Greaves, H. 2004. Understanding Deutsch's probability in a deterministic multiverse. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38: 120–52.
Greaves, H. 2007. Probability in the Everett interpretation. Philosophy Compass 2: 109–28.
Green, D. P. and I. Shapiro 1994. Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Haggard, P. 2003. Conscious awareness of intention and action. In J. Roessler and N. Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 111–27.
Hájek, A. 2003. What conditional probability could not be. Synthese 137: 273–323.
Hammond, P. 1988. Consequentialist foundations for expected utility theory. Theory and Decision 25: 25–78.
Hampshire, S. 1975. Freedom of the Individual. London: Chatto and Windus.
Hausman, D. 1999. Lessons from quantum mechanics. Synthese 121: 79–92.
Hedden, B. 2012. Options and the subjective ought. Philosophical Studies 158: 343–60.
Hitchcock, C. 1996. Causal decision theory and decision-theoretic causality. Noûs 30: 508–26.
Hitchcock, C. 2004. Do all and only causes raise the probabilities of effects? In J. Collins, N. Hall and L. A. Paul (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press: 403–17.
Hitchcock, C. 2007. What Russell got right. In R. Corry and H. Price (eds.), Causation, Physics and the Constitution of Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 45–65.
Horgan, T. 1981. Counterfactuals and Newcomb's problem. Journal of Philosophy 78: 331–56.
Horgan, T. 1985. Newcomb's problem: a stalemate. In R. Campbell and L. Sowden (eds.), Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation: Prisoner's Dilemma and Newcomb's Problem. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press: 223–34.
Horwich, P. 1987. Asymmetries in Time: Problems in the Philosophy of Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Hubin, D. and G. Ross. 1985. Newcomb's perfect predictor. Noûs 19: 439–46.
Hume, D. 1949 [1738]. Treatise of Human Nature. London: J. M. Dent.
Hume, D. 1975 [1777]. Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. Ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Ismael, J. 2007. Freedom, compulsion and causation. Psyche 13.
Jarrett, J. P. 1984. On the physical significance of the locality conditions in the Bell arguments. Noûs 18: 569–89.
Jaynes, E. T. 2003. Probability Theory: The Logic of Science: Principles and Elementary Applications vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jeffrey, R. C. 1965. The Logic of Decision. 1st edition. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Jeffrey, R. C. 1977. Savage's Omelet. In PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1976: 361–71.
Jeffrey, R. C. 1983. The Logic of Decision. 2nd edition. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Joyce, J. 1999. Foundations of Causal Decision Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Joyce, J. 2002. Levi on Causal Decision Theory and the possibility of predicting one's own actions. Philosophical Studies 110: 69–102.
Joyce, J. 2007. Are Newcomb problems really decisions?Synthese 156: 537–62.
Joyce, J. 2012. Regret and instability in Causal Decision Theory. Synthese 187: 123–45.
Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky. 1981. The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. Science 1981: 453–8.
Kant, I. 1964 [1785]. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Tr. H. J. Paton. New York: Harper and Row.
Kant, I. 2000 [1781/7]. Critique of Pure Reason. Ed. and tr. P. Guyer and A. W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Koestner, R., G. F. Losier, N. M. Worren, L. Baker and R. J. Vallerand. 1995. False consensus effects for the 1992 Canadian referendum. Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science 27: 214–25.
Knox, R. E. and J. A. Inkster. 1998. Postdecision dissonance at post time. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 8: 319–23.
Kraft, C. H., J. W. Pratt and A. Seidenberg. 1959. Intuitive probability on finite sets. Annals of Mathematical Statistics 30: 408–19.
Kreps, D. M. 1988. Notes on the Theory of Choice. Boulder, CO: Westview.
Kreps, D. M. 1990. Game Theory and Economic Modelling. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kripke, S. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell.
Krueger, J. and J. S. Zeiger. 1993. Social categorization and the truly false consensus effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65: 670–80.
Kvart, I. 2004. Probabilistic cause, edge conditions, late preemption, and discrete cases. In P. Dowe and P. Noordhof (eds.), Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World. London: Routledge: 163–87.
Kydland, F. E. and E. C. Prescott. 1977. Rules rather than discretion: the inconsistency of optimal plans. Journal of Political Economy 85: 473–91.
Laudisa, F. 2001. Non-locality and theories of causation. In J. Butterfield and T. Placek (eds.), Non-locality and Modality. Dordrecht: Kluwer: 223–34.
Ledwig, M. 2000. Newcomb's problem. Dissertation submitted to the University of Constance.
Leeds, S. 1984. Eells and Jeffrey on Newcomb's problem. Philosophical Studies 46: 97–107.
Leslie, J. 1991. Ensuring two bird deaths with one throw. Mind 100: 73–86.
Levi, I. 1974. On indeterminate probabilities. Journal of Philosophy 56: 391–418.
Levi, I. 1975. Newcomb's many problems. Theory and Decision 6: 161–75.
Levi, I. 1985. Common causes, smoking and lung cancer. In R. Campbell and L. Sowden (eds.), Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation: Prisoner's Dilemma and Newcomb's Problem. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press: 234–47.
Levi, I. 1986. Hard Choices. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Levi, I. 1989. Rationality, prediction and autonomous choice. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Supp. Vol. 19: 339–63. Reprinted in his Covenant of Reason: Rationality and the Commitments of Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997: 19–39.
Levi, I. 1992. Consequentialism and sequential choice. In M. Bacharach and S. Hurley (eds.), Foundations of Decision Theory. Oxford: Blackwell: 92–122. Reprinted in I. Levi, The Covenant of Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997: 70–101.
Lewis, D. K. 1973a. Causation. Journal of Philosophy 70: 556–67. Reprinted in his Philosophical Papers vol. 2 Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986: 159–213.
Lewis, D. K. 1973b. Counterfactuals. Oxford: Blackwell.
Lewis, D. K. 1979a. Counterfactual dependence and time's arrow. Noûs 13: 455–76. Reprinted in his Philosophical Papers vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986: 32–66.
Lewis, D. K. 1979b. Prisoners’ dilemma is a Newcomb problem. Philosophy and Public Affairs 8: 235–40. Reprinted in his Philosophical Papers vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986: 299–304.
Lewis, D. K. 1980. A subjectivist's guide to objective chance. In R. Jeffrey, ed., Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, vol. 2. Berkeley and Los Angeles: California University Press: 263–93. Reprinted in his Philosophical Papers vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986: 83–132.
Lewis, D. K. 1981a. Are we free to break the laws?Theoria 47: 113–21. Reprinted in his Philosophical Papers vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986: 291–8.
Lewis, D. K. 1981b. Causal decision theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59: 5–30. Reprinted in his Philosophical Papers vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986: 305–39.
Lewis, D. K. 1981c. Why ain'cha rich?Noûs 15: 277–80. Reprinted in his Papers in Ethics and Social Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000: 37–41.
Lewis, D. K. 1983. Levi against U-maximization. Journal of Philosophy 80: 531–4.
Lewis, D. K. 1986. Events. In his Philosophical Papers vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 241–69.
Locke, J. 1975 [1689]. Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Ed. P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Loewer, B. 2007. Counterfactuals and the second law. In R. Corry and H. Price (eds.), Causation, Physics and the Constitution of Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 293–326.
McClennen, E. F. 1990. Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
McFetridge, I. 1990. Logical necessity: some issues. In his Logical Necessity and Other Essays. Ed. J. Haldane and R. Scruton. London: Aristotelian Society: 135–54.
McKay, P. K. 2007. Freedom, fiction and Evidential Decision Theory. Erkenntnis 66: 393–407.
Mackie, J. L. 1980. The Cement of the Universe. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Maher, P. 1990. Symptomatic acts and the value of evidence in Causal Decision Theory. Philosophy of Science 57: 479–98.
Maher, P. 1992. Diachronic rationality. Philosophy of Science 59: 120–41.
Maher, P. 1993. Betting on Theories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Maudlin, T. 2002. Quantum Non-locality and Relativity. Oxford: Blackwell.
Meacham, C. 2010. Binding and its consequences. Philosophical Studies 149: 49–71.
Meek, C. and C. Glymour. 1994. Conditioning and intervening. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45: 1001–21.
Mellor, D. H. 1983. Objective decision making. Social Theory and Practice 9: 289–309. Reprinted in his Matters of Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991: 269–87.
Mellor, D. H. 1987. Fixed past, unfixed future. In B. Taylor (ed.), Michael Dummett: Contributions to Philosophy. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff: 166–84.
Mellor, D. H. 1993. How to believe a conditional. Journal of Philosophy 60: 233–48.
Mellor, D. H. 2005. What does subjective decision theory tell us? In H. Lillehammer and D. H. Mellor (eds.), Ramsey's Legacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 137–48.
Menzies, P. and H. Price. 1993. Causation as a secondary quality. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44: 187–203.
Mermin, N. 1981. Quantum mysteries for anyone. Journal of Philosophy 78: 397–408.
Michotte, A. 1963. The Perception of Causality. London: Methuen.
Mill, J. S. 1952 [1843]. A System of Logic. 8th edition. London: Longmans, Green and Co.
Moran, R. 2001. Authority and Estrangement. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Morton, A. 2002. The Importance of Being Understood: Folk Psychology as Ethics. London: Routledge.
Muckenheim, W. 1982. A resolution of the Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen paradox. Lettere al Nuovo Cimento 35: 300–4.
Mullen, B., J. L. Atkins, D. S. Champion, C. Edwards, D. Hardy and J. E. Story. 1985. The false consensus effect: a meta-analysis of 115 hypothesis tests. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 21: 262–83.
Muth, J. F. 1961. Rational expectations and the theory of price movements. Econometrica 29: 315–35.
Nagel, T. 1970. The Possibility of Altruism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nozick, R. 1969. Newcomb's problem and two principles of choice. In N. Rescher (ed.), Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel. Dordrecht: D. Reidel: 114–46. Reprinted in P. Moser (ed.), Rationality in Action: Contemporary Approaches. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990: 207–34.
Nozick, R. 1993. The Nature of Rationality. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Osborne, M. J. and A. Rubinstein. 1994. A Course in Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
O’Shaughnessy, B. 2008. The Will: A Dual Aspect Theory. 2nd editon. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Parfit, D. 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pearl, J. 2000. Causality: Models, Reasoning and Inference. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Peterson, M. 2009. An Introduction to Decision Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pollock, J. L. 2010. A resource-bounded agent addresses the Newcomb problem. Synthese 176: 57–82.
Price, H. 1986a. Against Causal Decision Theory. Synthese 67: 195–212.
Price, H. 1986b. Conditional credence. Mind 95: 18–36.
Price, H. 1991. Agency and probabilistic causality. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42: 157–76.
Price, H. 1993. The direction of causation: Ramsey's ultimate contingency. Philosophy of Science Association 2: 253–67.
Price, H. 2010. Decisions, decisions, decisions: can Savage salvage Everettian probability? In S. Saunders, J. Barrett, A. Kent and D. Wallace (eds.), Many Worlds? Everett, Quantum Theory and Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 369–90.
Price, H. 2012. Causation, chance, and the rational significance of supernatural evidence. Philosophical Review 121: 483–538.
Quattrone, G. A. and A. Tversky. 1986. Self-deception and the voter's illusion. In J. Elster (ed.), The Multiple Self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 35–58.
Quine, W. V. 1981. What price bivalence?Journal of Philosophy 78: 90–5. Reprinted in his Theories and Things. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1981: 31–7.
Rabinowicz, W. 2000. Money pump with foresight. In M. J. Almeida (ed.), Imperceptible Harms and Benefits. Dordrecht: Kluwer: 123–54.
Rabinowicz, W. 2002. Does practical deliberation crowd out self-prediction?Erkenntnis 57: 91–122.
Ramsey, F. P. 1990 [1926]. Truth and probability. In his Philosophical Papers, ed. D. H. Mellor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 52–94.
Ramsey, F. P. 1990 [1928]. Universals of law and of fact. In his Philosophical Papers, ed. D. H. Mellor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 140–4.
Ramsey, F. P. 1990 [1929]. General propositions and causality. In his Philosophical Papers, ed. D. H. Mellor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 145–63.
Reichenbach, H. 1971. The Direction of Time. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Reid, T. 2001 [1792]. Of power. Philosophical Quarterly 51: 1–12.
Resnik, M. 1987. Choices: An Introduction to Decision Theory. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Riker, W. H. and P. C. Ordeshook. 1968. A theory of the calculus of voting. American Political Science Review 62: 25–43.
Ritchie, A. D. 1967. George Berkeley: A Reappraisal. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Rosen, D. 1978. In defense of a probabilistic theory of causality. Philosophy of Science 45: 604–13.
Ross, L., D. Greene and P. House. 1977. The ‘false consensus effect’: an egocentric bias in social perception and attribution processes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 13: 279–301.
Russell, B. A. W. 1913. On the notion of cause. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 13: 1–26.
Russell, B. A. W. 1926 [1914]. Our Knowledge of the External World. London: George Allen and Unwin.
Salmon, W. 1984. Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Samuelson, P. 1963. Risk and uncertainty: a fallacy of large numbers. Scientia 98: 108–13.
Sartre, J. 1969. Being and Nothingness. Tr. H. Barnes. London: Routledge.
Savage, L. J. 1972. The Foundations of Statistics. 2nd edition. New York: Dover.
Schopenhauer, A. 1995 [1819]. The World as Will and Idea. Abridged. Ed. D. Berman. Tr. J. Berman. London: Everyman.
Seidenfeld, T. 1984. Comments on Causal Decision Theory. Philosophy of Science Association 2: 201–12.
Sen, A. K. 1977. Rational fools: a critique of the behavioural foundations of economic theory. Philosophy and Public Affairs 6: 317–44.
Shafir, E. and A. Tversky. 1992. Thinking through uncertainty: nonconsequential reasoning and choice. Cognitive Psychology 24: 449–74.
Shafir, S., T. Reich, E. Tsur, I. Erev and A. Lotem. 2008. Perceptual accuracy and conflicting effects of certainty on risk-taking behaviour. Nature 453: 917–20.
Skyrms, B. 1980. Causal Necessity. New Haven: Yale Universty Press.
Skyrms, B. 1982. Causal Decision Theory. Journal of Philosophy 79: 695–711.
Skyrms, B. 1984a. EPR: Lessons for metaphysics. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9: 245–55.
Skyrms, B. 1984b. Pragmatics and Empiricism. New Haven: Yale Universty Press.
Slezak, P. 2013. Realizing Newcomb's problem. Available online from philsci-archive.pitt.edu (accessed 2 July 2013).
Sloman, S. 2005. Causal Models. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sobel, J. H. 1986. Notes on decision theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64: 407–37. Reprinted in his Taking Chances. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994: 141–73.
Sobel, J. H. 1988. Infallible predictors. Philosophical Review 97: 3–24. Reprinted in his Taking Chances. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994: 100–18.
Sobel, J. H. 1989. Kent Bach on good arguments. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20: 447–53.
Sobel, J. H. 1990. Newcomblike problems. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15: 224–55. Reprinted in his Taking Chances. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994: 31–76.
Stalnaker, R. 1980 [1972]. Letter to David Lewis. In W. L. Harper, R. Stalnaker and G. Pearce (eds.), Ifs: Conditionals, Belief, Decision, Chance, and Time. Dordrecht: D. Reidel: 151–2.
Strotz, R. H. 1955. Myopia and inconsistency in dynamic utility maximization. Review of Economic Studies 23: 165–80.
Suppes, P. 1970. A Probabilistic Theory of Causality. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Valentini, A. 2009. Beyond the quantum. Physics World 2009: 32–7.
Van Fraassen, B. C. 1991. Quantum Mechanics: An Empiricist View. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Van Inwagen, P. 1983. An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Varian, H. 1992. Microeconomic Analysis. 3rd edition. New York: W. W. Norton and Co.
Varian, H. 2003. Intermediate Microeconomics. 6th edtion. New York: W. W. Norton and Co.
Verbeek, B. 2008. Consequentialism and rational choice: lessons from the Allais paradox. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89: 86–116.
Von Wright, G. H. 1973. On the logic and epistemology of the causal relation. In P. Suppes et al. (eds.), Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science IV. Amsterdam: North-Holland: 293–312. Reprinted in E. Sosa and M. Tooley (eds.), Causation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993: 105–24.
Wallace, D. 2007. Quantum probability from subjective likelihood: improving on Deutsch's proof of the probability rule. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 34: 415–39.
Weber, M. 1992 [1920]. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Tr. T. Parsons. London: Routledge.
Wegner, D. 2002. The Illusion of Conscious Will. Bradford Books, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Weirich, P. 1998. Equilibrium and Rationality: Game Theory Revised by Decision Rules. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Weirich, P. 2001. Decision Space: Multidimensional Utility Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Weirich, P. 2013. Decisions without sharp probabilities. Unpublished typescript.
Williamson, J. 2008. Objective Bayesian probabilistic logic. Journal of Algorithms 63: 167–83.
Williamson, T. 2007. The Philosophy of Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L. 2009 [1951]. Philosophical Investigations. Tr. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker and J. Schulte. Revised 4th edition by P. M. S. Hacker and J. Schulte. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.
Wolfson, S. 2000. Students’ estimates for the prevalence of drug use: evidence for a false consensus effect. Psychology of Addictive Behaviours 14: 295–8.
Wolpert, D. H. and G. Benford. 2013. The lesson of Newcomb's paradox. Synthese 190: 1637–46.
Woodward, J. 2003. Making Things Happen. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Metrics

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 15
Total number of PDF views: 208 *
Loading metrics...

Book summary page views

Total views: 542 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between September 2016 - 24th October 2017. This data will be updated every 24 hours.