Statecraft often appears irrational. Why do states issue ultimatums they anticipate will be rejected? Expecting to Fail resolves this puzzle by introducing the concept of 'insincere coercion' – a strategic process whereby states adopt coercive strategies not to reach compromise, but as an instrumental means of achieving broader foreign policy goals through brute force. Utilizing a militarized conflict model and an original Coercion in Interstate Militarized Conflict (CIMC) dataset, this book demonstrates that insincere coercion is a rational tool used to mobilize international and domestic support, make examples of targets, or restore deterrence. Featuring detailed case studies of the Falklands War, the Gulf War, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the Second Lebanon War, Phil Haun offers a thoughtful reconsideration of the relationship between threats and brute force. Essential for scholars and practitioners alike, this work exposes the 'tragic utility of violence' in an uncertain international landscape.

‘Coercion often fails in international politics, but sometimes this is the point. Phil Haun overturns the conventional wisdom about coercive diplomacy by explaining why states make insincere threats to advance their interests. This book is a must-read for students of airpower and strategy.'

Jon R. Lindsay - Georgia Institute of Technology, and author of ‘Age of Deception'

‘This fascinating and counterintuitive book explains why states make demands that they expect or even want their adversaries to reject. With careful theorizing and detailed evidence, Haun shows that some coercive failures-even those leading to war-are foreign policy successes. A must-read for those seeking to understand threats, conflict, and international security.'

Caitlin Talmadge - Raphael Dorman-Helen Starbuck Associate Professor of Political Science, The Massachusetts Institute of Technology

‘Why is violent coercion such a popular policy tool when its record of success is so dismal? That puzzle has vexed generations of international security scholars, and in 'Expecting to Fail', Phil Haun solves it. With a new dataset and an impressive array of case studies, he provides a fresh way of thinking about how threats to use force work in international politics. The grim truth is that failed coercive threats may be rational success stories in a state's larger strategy. The theory is smart and the research is impeccable. This is a signal advance in scholarship.'

William C. Wohlforth - Daniel Webster Professor, Dartmouth College