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The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory
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  • Cited by 166
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    Stewart, Rush T. and Quintana, Ignacio Ojea 2017. Learning and Pooling, Pooling and Learning. Erkenntnis,


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    The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory
    • Online ISBN: 9780511498497
    • Book DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511498497
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Book description

This book defends the view that any adequate account of rational decision making must take a decision maker's beliefs about causal relations into account. The early chapters of the book introduce the non-specialist to the rudiments of expected utility theory. The major technical advance offered by the book is a 'representation theorem' that shows that both causal decision theory and its main rival, Richard Jeffrey's logic of decision, are both instances of a more general conditional decision theory. The book solves a long-standing problem for Jeffrey's theory by showing for the first time how to obtain a unique utility and probability representation for preferences and judgements of comparative likelihood. The book also contains a major new discussion of what it means to suppose that some event occurs or that some proposition is true. The most complete and robust defence of causal decision theory available.

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