Game Theoretic Analysis of Voting in Committees

Bezalel Peleg

doi:10.1017/CCOL0521259649

This book is a theoretical and completely rigorous analysis of voting in committees that provides mathematical proof of the existence of democratic voting systems, which are immune to the manipulation of preferences of coalitions of voters. The author begins by determining the power distribution among voters that is induced by a voting rule, giving particular consideration to choice by plurality voting and Borda's rule. He then constructs, for all possible committees, well-behaved representative voting procedures which are not distorted by strategic voting, giving complete solutions for certain important classes of committees. The solution to the problem of mass elections is fully characterised.

- Aa Reduce text
- Aa Enlarge text

View selected items
Save to my bookmarks
Export citations
Download PDF (zip)
Save to Kindle
Save to Dropbox
Save to Google Drive
Save content to
To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to .

To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Please be advised that item(s) you selected are not available.
You are about to save
Your Kindle email address

Please provide your Kindle email.

@free.kindle.com @kindle.com (service fees apply)

By using this service, you agree that you will only keep content for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services

Metrics

Total number of HTML views: 0

Total number of PDF views: 0 *

Loading metrics...

Total views: 0 *

Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between #date#. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

Usage data cannot currently be displayed.

Why this information is here

This section outlines the accessibility features of this content - including support for screen readers, full keyboard navigation and high-contrast display options. This may not be relevant for you.

Accessibility Information

Accessibility compliance for the PDF of this book is currently unknown and may be updated in the future.

Game Theoretic Analysis of Voting in Committees

This Book has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by Crossref.

Book description

Refine List

Actions for selected content:

Contents

Frontmatter
pp i-x

Background and Motivation
pp 1-7

1 - Introduction and Summary of the Main Results
pp 8-19

2 - Preliminary Concepts and Basic Results
pp 20-37

3 - Representations of Committees
pp 38-62

4 - Strong and Dynamic Representations
pp 63-85

5 - Exactly and Strongly Consistent Anonymous Social Choice Functions
pp 86-108

6 - Effectivity Functions and Implementation
pp 109-150

7 - Concluding Remarks
pp 151-162

References
pp 163-166

Author Index
pp 167-167

Subject index
pp 168-169

Metrics

Full text views

Book summary page views

Accessibility standard: Unknown

Why this information is here

Accessibility Information

Game Theoretic Analysis of Voting in Committees

Book description

Refine List

Actions for selected content:

Save Search

Contents

Metrics

Full text views

Book summary page views

Accessibility standard: Unknown

Why this information is here

Accessibility Information