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Game Theoretic Analysis of Voting in Committees
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  • Cited by 53
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    Game Theoretic Analysis of Voting in Committees
    • Online ISBN: 9781139052283
    • Book DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CCOL0521259649
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Book description

This book is a theoretical and completely rigorous analysis of voting in committees that provides mathematical proof of the existence of democratic voting systems, which are immune to the manipulation of preferences of coalitions of voters. The author begins by determining the power distribution among voters that is induced by a voting rule, giving particular consideration to choice by plurality voting and Borda's rule. He then constructs, for all possible committees, well-behaved representative voting procedures which are not distorted by strategic voting, giving complete solutions for certain important classes of committees. The solution to the problem of mass elections is fully characterised.

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