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  • Publisher:
    Cambridge University Press
    ISBN:
    9781108529655
    9781009747493
    9781108438605
    Dimensions:
    (229 x 152 mm)
    Weight & Pages:
    0.5kg, 74 Pages
    Dimensions:
    (229 x 152 mm)
    Weight & Pages:
    74 Pages
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    Book description

    What is human dignity? Kant's philosophy is a central inspiration for our contemporary conception that all human beings deserve respect – independently of their race, gender, religion, or social status. In this Element, I shall address four topics in Kant's moral philosophy: What specifically does one have to do (or refrain fromdoing) to respect a human being? What is the reason why one should respect human beings? What is dignity, that is, what does the term mean, and what kind of thing is it? Finally, in a short appendix, I shall address the questions: Do only human beings deserve respect; how could one extend it to nonhuman animals as well? In each section, I shall offer a range of different interpretations of how one can read Kant's texts, and I shall address their advantages and disadvantages. This gives readers the option to choose for themselves which reading is the most plausible interpretation of human dignity.

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