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  3. Indeterminacy in the World
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    • Publisher:
      Cambridge University Press
      Publication date:
      03 May 2023
      01 June 2023
      ISBN:
      9781009057370
      9781009056014
      DOI:
      https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009057370
      Dimensions:
      Weight & Pages:
      Dimensions:
      (229 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.15kg, 94 Pages
      • Series:
      Elements in Metaphysics
      Subjects:
      Epistemology and Metaphysics, Philosophy: General Interest, Philosophy
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    Series:
    Elements in Metaphysics
    Subjects:
    Epistemology and Metaphysics, Philosophy: General Interest, Philosophy
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    Book description

    The way we represent the world in thought and language is shot through with indeterminacy: we speak of red apples and yellow apples without thereby committing to any sharp cutoff between the application of the predicate 'red' and of the predicate 'yellow'. But can reality itself be indeterminate? In other words, can indeterminacy originate in the mind-independent world, and not only in our representations? If so, can the phenomenon also arise at the microscopic scale of fundamental physics? Section 1 of this Element provides a brief overview of the question of indeterminacy. Section 2 discusses the thesis that the world is comprised of indeterminate objects, whereas Section 3 focuses on the thesis that there are indeterminate states of affairs. Finally, Section 4 is devoted to the case study of indeterminacy in quantum physics.

    References

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