Drawing on Kleist’s pedagogical devices and their narrative implications, this chapter analyzes the various manners in which Kant presents the “historical a priori” of science in the Second Preface to the Critique of Pure Reason. The argument is that he develops a carefully nuanced continuum of different conceptual-narrative versions of the “Copernican revolution” within various sciences including, finally, metaphysics. While mathematics allows for a degree zero of narration in the statement constituting its becoming science, the experimental sciences call for increasingly more detailed histories of how they have undergone their respective turns to science. After an aside on the contemporary thinker and scientist, G. Chr. Lichtenberg, and his concept of “paradigms” of sciences, which seems to anticipate Kuhn’s famous conceptualization, the chapter returns briefly to Kleist for its conclusion, this time highlighting instances of quasi-“transcendental” turning points in his novellas. In most instances the moment of the dawning light is marked by a transition from narrative past to present. In the case of Kleist’s novellas the question is whether the given narrative focuses on just one or many moments of the breaking light and in which way these moments function as turning points familiar from the novella form since the Renaissance and confirmed by Goethe. While focusing on concept and narrative in Kant, the chapter thus offers also a new perspective on Kleist’s “Kant Crisis.”