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  • Cited by 7
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
May 2024
Print publication year:
2024
Online ISBN:
9781108885232

Book description

This Element considers Kant's conception of self-control and the role it plays in his moral philosophy. It offers a detailed interpretation of the different terms used by Kant to explain the phenomenon of moral self-control, such as 'autocracy' and 'inner freedom'. Following Kant's own suggestions, the proposed reading examines the Kantian capacity for self-control as an ability to 'abstract from' various sensible impressions by looking beyond their influence on the mind. This analysis shows that Kant's conception of moral self-control involves two intimately related levels, which need not meet the same criteria. One level is associated with realizing various ends, the other with setting moral ends. The proposed view most effectively accommodates self-control's role in the adoption of virtuous maxims and ethical end-setting. It explains why self-control is central to Kant's conception of virtue and sheds new light on his discussions of moral strength and moral weakness.

References

1

1 Primary Sources

References are to Kants gesammelte Schriften. Ausgabe der Preussischen (later Deutschen) Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: Georg Reimer, subsequently Walter de Gruyter, 1900). Except where indicated otherwise, translations are based on the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, eds. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

References to Kant’s works are given using the following abbreviation scheme:

Anth

Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View

CF

Conflict of the Faculties

CJ

Critique of the Power of Judgement

CPR

Critique of Pure Reason

CPrR

Critique of Practical Reason

G

Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals

ID

Inaugural Dissertation

L-Anth

Lectures on Anthropology

L-Eth

Lectures on Ethics

L-Met

Lectures on Metaphysics

MM

The Metaphysics of Morals

NMM

Kant’s Notes to the Metaphysics of Morals

PM

What Real Progress Has Metaphysics

Made in Germany Since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff?

Rel

Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason

TP

On the Common Saying:

That May be Correct in Theory, but it is of No Use in Practice

2

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