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  3. Kant's Theory of Conscience
  • Cited by 16
      • Samuel Kahn, Indiana University–Purdue University, Indianapolis
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    • Publisher:
      Cambridge University Press
      Publication date:
      April 2021
      May 2021
      ISBN:
      9781108694278
      9781108717359
      DOI:
      https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108694278
      Dimensions:
      Weight & Pages:
      Dimensions:
      (229 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.118kg, 70 Pages
      • Subjects:
      History of Philosophy, Eighteenth-Century Philosophy, Philosophy Texts, Philosophy
      Series:
      Elements in the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant
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    Subjects:
    History of Philosophy, Eighteenth-Century Philosophy, Philosophy Texts, Philosophy
    Series:
    Elements in the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant
    Information

    Book description

    The main body of this Element, about Kant's theory of conscience, is divided into two sections. The first focuses on exegesis of Kant's ethics. One of the overarching theses of this section of the Element is that, although many of Kant's claims about conscience are prima facie inconsistent, a close examination of context generally can dissolve apparent contradictions. The second section of the Element focuses on philosophical issues in Kantian ethics. One of the overarching theses of this section of the Element is that many positions traditionally associated with Kantian ethics, including the denial of moral luck, the nonaccidental rightness condition, and the guise of the objectively good, are at variance with Kant's ethics.

    References

    References

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    Driver, Julia. 2013. “Luck and Fortune in Moral Evaluation,” in Contrastivism in Philosophy (ed. by Blaauw, Martijn). Routledge: 154–172.
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    Wood, Allen. 2008. Kantian Ethics. Cambridge University Press

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