Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
  1. Home
  2. Books
  3. Knowledge-First Epistemology
  • Cited by 9
      • Show more authors
      • Open Access
      You have digital access to this book
    • Select format
    • Publisher:
      Cambridge University Press
      Publication date:
      20 March 2025
      27 March 2025
      ISBN:
      9781009454964
      9781009454988
      9781009454995
      DOI:
      https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009454964
      Creative Commons:
      Creative Common License - CC Creative Common License - BY Creative Common License - NC
      This content is Open Access and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence CC-BY-NC 4.0.
      https://creativecommons.org/creativelicenses
      Dimensions:
      (229 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.252kg, 78 Pages
      Dimensions:
      (229 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.136kg, 78 Pages
      • Subjects:
      Epistemology and Metaphysics, Philosophy: General Interest, Philosophy
      Series:
      Elements in Epistemology
    Open Access
    You have digital access to this book
    Selected: Digital
    View content
    Add to cart View cart Buy from Cambridge.org
    Subjects:
    Epistemology and Metaphysics, Philosophy: General Interest, Philosophy
    Series:
    Elements in Epistemology
    Information

    Book description

    Knowledge-first epistemology places knowledge at the normative core of epistemological affairs: on this approach, central epistemic phenomena are to be analyzed in terms of knowledge. This Element offers a defence of an integrated, naturalistic knowledge-first account of justified belief, reasons, evidence and defeat, permissible assertion and action, and the epistemic normativity of practical and theoretical reasoning. On this account, the epistemic is an independent normative domain organized around one central etiological epistemic function: generating knowledge. In turn, this epistemic function generates epistemic norms of proper functioning that constitute the epistemic domain, and govern moves in our epistemic practice, such as forming beliefs, asserting, and reasoning. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

    References

    References

    Beddor, B. (2020). New Work for Certainty. Philosophers’ Imprint, 20(8): 1–25.
    Benton, M. (2011). Two More for the Knowledge Account of Assertion. Analysis, 71: 684–687.
    Benton, M. (2014). Knowledge Norms. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://iep.utm.edu/kn-norms/
    Bird, A. (2007). Justified Judging. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 74: 81–110.
    Bird, A. (2010). Social Knowing. Philosophical Perspectives, 24: 23–56.
    Bird, A. (2022). Knowing Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Blome-Tillmann, M. (2017). ‘More Likely than Not’ – Knowledge First and the Role of Bare Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law. In Carter, A., Gordon, E., and Jarvis, B. (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind, 278–292. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Boholm, M., McColler, N., and Hansson, S. O. (2016). The Concepts of Risk, Safety and Security: Applications in Everyday Language. Risk Analysis, 36(2): 320–338.
    BonJour, L. (1980). Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5: 53–73.
    BonJour, L. (1985). The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
    Bratman, M. E. (1981). Intention and Means-End Reasoning. The Philosophical Review, 90(2): 252–265.
    Brown, J. (2005). Williamson on Luminosity and Contextualism. The Philosophical Quarterly, 55(219): 319–327.
    Brown, J. (2008). Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning. Noûs, 42(2008): 167–189.
    Brown, J. (2010). Knowledge and Assertion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81: 549–566.
    Brown, J. (2011). Assertion and Practical Reasoning: Common or Divergent Epistemic Standards? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 84(1): 123–157.
    Brown, J. (2018). Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Buller, D. J. (1998). Etiological Theories of Function: A Geographical Survey. Biology and Philosophy, 13(4): 505–527.
    Burge, T. (1993). Content Preservation. Philosophical Review, 102(4): 457–488.
    Burge, T. (2003). Perceptual Entitlement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 67(3): 503–548.
    Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. (2015). Knowledge-How and Cognitive Achievement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 91(1): 181–199.
    Carter, A. and Miracchi, L. (2024). What the Tortoise Should Do: A Knowledge-First Virtue Approach to the Basing Relation. Nous, 58(2): 456–481.
    Choi, S. and Fara, M. (2018). Dispositions. In Zalta, E. N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 Edition). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/dispositions/.
    Cohen, S. (1986). Knowledge and Context. The Journal of Philosophy, 83: 574–583.
    Cummins, R. (1975). Functional Analysis. The Journal of Philosophy, 72(20): 741–765.
    DeRose, K. (2002). Assertion, Knowledge, and Context. Philosophical Review, 111: 167–203.
    Douven, I. (2008). Knowledge and Practical Reasoning. Dialectica, 62(1): 101–118.
    Douven, I. (2009). Assertion, Moore and Bayes. Philosophical Studies, 144: 361–375.
    Douven, I. and Williamson, T. (2006). Generalizing the Lottery Paradox. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 57 (4): 755–779.
    Dutant, J. and Littlejohn, C. (2021). Defeaters as Indicators of Ignorance. In Brown, J. and Simion, M. (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Elgin, C. Z. (2017). True Enough. Cambridge: MIT Press.
    van Elswyk, P. and Willard-Kyle, C. (Forthcoming). Hedging and the Norm of Belief, Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    Falbo, A. (2023). Inquiring Minds Want to Improve. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 101(2): 298–312.
    Fantl, J. and McGrath, M. (2002). Evidence, Pragmatics and Justification. Philosophical Review, 111(1): 67–94.
    Fantl, J. and McGrath, M. (2009). Knowledge in an Uncertain World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Fassio, D. (2017). Is There an Epistemic Norm of Practical Reasoning? Philosophical Studies, 174: 2137–2166.
    Feltz, A. and Zarpentine, C. (2010). Do You Know More When It Matters Less? Philosophical Psychology, 23(5): 683–706.
    Friedman, J. (2020). The Epistemic and the Zetetic. Philosophical Review, 129(4): 501–536.
    Garcia-Carpintero, M. (2004). Assertion and the Semantics of Force-Markers. In Bianchi, C. (ed.), The Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction, 133–166. CSLI.
    Geach, P. (1956). Good and Evil. Analysis, 17: 33–42.
    Gerken, M. (2011). Warrant and Action. Synthese, 178(3): 529–547.
    Gerken, M. (2014). Same, Same but Different: The Epistemic Norms of Assertion, Action, and Practical Reasoning. Philosophical Studies, 168: 725–744.
    Gerken, M. (2018). Against Knowledge-First Epistemology. In Gordon, E., Jarvis, B., and Carter, A. (eds.), Knowledge-First Approaches in Epistemology and Mind, 46–71. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Gettier, E. (1963). Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Analysis, 23: 121–123.
    Gibbons, J. (2013). The Norm of Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Goldberg, S. (2015). Assertion: The Philosophical Significance of a Speech Act. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Goldberg, S. (2016). On the Epistemic Significance of Evidence You Should Have Had. Episteme, 13(4): 449–470.
    Goldberg, S. (2018). To the Best of Our Knowledge: Social Expectations and Epistemic Normativity. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    Goldman, A. (1976). Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge. The Journal of Philosophy, 73(20): 771–791.
    Goldman, A. (1988). Strong and Weak Justification. Philosophical Perspectives, 2: 51–69.
    Goodman, J. and Salow, B. (2018). Taking a Chance on KK. Philosophical Studies, 175(1): 183–196.
    Graham, P. J. (2008). Testimonial Entitlement and the Function of Comprehension. In Pritchard, D., Millar, A., and Haddock, A. (eds.), Social Epistemology, 148–174. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Graham, P. J. (2012). Epistemic Entitlement. Nous, 46(3): 449–482.
    Graham, P. J. (2014). Functions, Warrant, History. In Fairweather, A. and Flanagan, O. (eds.), Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue, 15–35. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Grice, P. (1989). Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
    Harman, G. (1986). Change in View: Principles of Reasoning, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
    Hawthorne, J. (2004). Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Hawthorne, J. and Srinivasan, A. (2013). Disagreement without Transparency: Some Bleak Thoughts. In Christensen, D. and Lackey, J. (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays, 9–30. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Hawthorne, J. and Stanley, J. (2008). Knowledge and Action. Journal of Philosophy, 105(10): 571–590.
    Hetherington, S. (2002). Epistemic Responsibility: A Dilemma. The Monist, 85(3): 398–414.
    Hetherington, S. (2022). Defining Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Hieronimy, P. (2009). The Will as Reason. Philosophical Perspectives, 23(1): 201–220.
    Ichikawa, J. J. (2014). Justification Is Potential Knowledge. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 44(2): 184–206.
    Kearl, T. and Willard-Kyle, C. (Forthcoming). Epistemic Cans. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Kelp, C. (2014a). Two for the Knowledge Goal of Inquiry. American Philosophical Quarterly, 51, 227–232.
    Kelp, C. (2014b). No Justification for Lottery Losers. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 95: 205–217.
    Kelp, C. (2015). Understanding Phenomena. Synthese, 192: 3799–3816.
    Kelp, C. (2016). Assertion: A Function First Account. Noûs, 5(2): 411–442. Online First.
    Kelp, C. (2018). Assertion: A Function First Account. Noûs, 52(2): 411–442.
    Kelp, C. (2021). Inquiry, Knowledge, and Understanding. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Kelp, C. (2023). The Nature and Normativity of Defeat. Cambridge Elements Series. Cambridge.
    Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2017). Commodious Knowledge. Synthese, 194(5): 1487–1502.
    Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2021). Sharing Knowledge: A Functionalist Account of Assertion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2024). Justification as the Proper Route to Knowledge. MS.
    Khalifa, K. (2017). Understanding, Explanation, and Scientific Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Klein, P. (2008). Useful False Beliefs. In Quentin, S. (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays, 25–61. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Korsgaard, C. (1986). Skepticism about Practical Reason. The Journal of Philosophy, 83(1): 5–25; reprinted in Korsgaard, C. (1996). Creating the Kingdom of Ends, 311–334. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Korsgaard, C. (1996). The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Kotzen, M. (2019). A Formal Account of Evidential Defeat. In Fitelson, B., Borges, R., and Braden, C. (eds.), Themes from Klein: Knowledge, Scepticism, and Justification, 213–234. Synthese Library.
    Kvanvig, J. (2003). The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Lackey, J. (2007). Norms of Assertion. Noûs, 41: 594–626.
    Lackey, J. (2008). Learning from Words. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Lackey, J. (2018). Duty to Object. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 101(1): 35–60. Online First.
    Lasonen-Aarnio, M. (2014). Higher-Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 88(2): 314–345.
    Lasonen-Aarnio, M. (MS). Feasible Dispositions: A Normative Framework. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Littlejohn, C. (2013). The Russellian Retreat. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 113(3): 293–320.
    Littlejohn, C. (2017). Truth, Knowledge, and the Standard of Proof in Criminal Law. Synthese, 197(12): 5253–5286.
    Littlejohn, C. (Forthcoming). A Plea for Epistemic Excuses. In Dorsch, F. and Dutant, J. (eds.), The New Evil Demon. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Littlejohn, C. and Turri, J. (2014). Epistemic Norms. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Lord, E. (2018). The Importance of Being Rational. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Maitra, I. (2011). Assertion, Norms and Games. In Brown, J. and Cappelen, H. (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays, 277–296. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    McGlynn, A. (2014). Knowledge First? Palgrave McMillan.
    McGlynn, A. (2024a). Known Unknowns and the Limits of Knowledge. In Steup, M., Roeber, B., Turri, J., and Sosa, E. (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Volume 3, 7–14. New York: Wiley-Blackwell.
    McGlynn, A. (2024b). Circumstantial Luck and Knowledge-First Epistemology. In Steup, M., Roeber, B., Turri, J., and Sosa, E. (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Volume 3, 16–19. Wiley-Blackwell.
    McGrath, M. (2015). Two Purposes of Knowledge Attribution and the Contextualism Debate. In Greco, J. and Henderson, D. K. (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology, 138–156. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    McHugh, C. (2012). The Truth Norm of Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 93(1): 8–30.
    McHugh, C. and Way, J. (2018). What is Good Reasoning? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 153–174.
    Millar, A. (2010). Knowledge and Recognition. In Pritchard, D., Millar, A., and Haddock, A. (eds.), The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Millar, A. (2011). Why Knowledge Matters. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 85(1): 63–81.
    Millikan, R. (1984). Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
    Millikan, R. G. (2004). Varieties of Meaning. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
    Miracchi, L. (2015). Competence to Know. Philosophical Studies, 172 (1): 29–56.
    Miracchi, L. (2017). When Evidence Isn’t Enough: Suspension, Evidentialism, and Knowledge-First Virtue Epistemology. Episteme, 16(4): 413–437.
    Miracchi, L. (Forthcoming). Competent Perspectives and the New Evil Demon Problem. In Dutant, Julien (ed.), The New Evil Demon: New Essays on Knowledge, Justification and Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Mona, S. and Kelp, C. (2015). The Tertiary Value Problem and the Superiority of Knowledge. American Philosophical Quarterly, 53(4): 397–410.
    Montminy, M. (2012). Why Assertion and Practical Reasoning Must Be Governed by the Same Epistemic Norm. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 93(4): 57–68.
    Moore, G. E. (1993). Principia Ethica (Revised Edition). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Moran, R. (2001). Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
    Moss, S. (2019). Knowledge and Legal Proof. Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 7(2023): 176–213.
    Nado, J. (2019). Who Wants to Know? In Gendler, T. and Hawthorne, J. (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 114–136. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Neander, K. (1991). The Teleological Notion of Function. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 69: 454–468.
    Pavese, C. (2015). Practical Senses. Philosophers’ Imprint, 15(29): 1–25.
    Plantinga, A. (1993). Warrant and Proper Function. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Pritchard, D. (2005). Epistemic Luck. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Pritchard, D. (2009). The Value of Knowledge. The Harvard Review of Philosophy, 16(1): 86–103.
    Pritchard, D. (2015). Risk. Metaphilosophy 46(3): 436–461.
    Pritchard, D., Miller, A., and Haddock, A. (eds.) (2010). The Nature and Value of Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Putnam, H. (1975). The Meaning of Meaning. In Mind, Language and Reality; Philosophical Papers Volume 2, 215–271. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Putnam, H. (1982). Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Reynolds, S. (2002). Testimony, Knowledge, and Epistemic Goals. Philosophical Studies, 110: 139–161.
    Reynolds, S. (2013). Justification as the Appearance of Knowledge. Philosophical Studies, 163: 367–383.
    Roeber, B. (2020). How to Argue for Pragmatic Encroachment. Synthese, 197: 2649–2664. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1850-4.
    Roeber, B. (2018b). The Pragmatic Encroachment Debate. Nous, 52(1): 171–195.
    Rudy-Hiller, F. (2018). The Epistemic Condition for Moral Responsibility. In Zalta, E. N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 Edition). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/moral-responsibility-epistemic/.
    Rysiew, P. (2001). The Context-Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions. Noûs, 35(4): 477–514.
    Schellenberg, S. (2018). The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Schnurr, J. (2017). The Unruly Mind: Against Doxastic Normativism. DPhil Thesis, Oxford University. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:c0aa4d1f-780c-43c3-a013-a0bdad9a2454/files/m7cdac4fb763a68e438552d5a3011b2a7.
    Schroeder, M. (2012). Value Theory. In Zalta, E. N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2012 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/value-theory/.
    Simion, M. (2016). Assertion: Knowledge Is Enough. Synthese, 193(10): 3041–3056.
    Simion, M. (2018a). Assertion: The Context Sensitivity Dilemma. Mind & Language, 34(4): 503–517.
    Simion, M. (2018b). A Puzzle for Epistemic WAMs. Synthese, 196(11): 4679–4689. Online First.
    Simion, M. (2018c). No Epistemic Norm for Action. American Philosophical Quarterly, 55(3): 231–238.
    Simion, M. (2018d). Epistemic Trouble for Engineering ‘Woman’. Logos and Episteme, 9(1): 91–98.
    Simion, M. (2019). Knowledge-First Functionalism. Philosophical Issues, 29(1): 254–267.
    Simion, M. (2021). Shifty Speech and Independent Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Simion, M., Kelp, C., and Ghijsen, H. (2016). Norms of Belief. Philosophical Issues, 26(1): 375–392.
    Simion, M. (2024a). Knowledge Comes First. In Steup, M., Roeber, B., Turri, J., and Sosa, E. (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Volume 3, 1–7. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Simion, M. (2024b). Knowledge Still Comes First. In Steup, M., Roeber, B., Turri, J., and Sosa, E. (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Volume 3, 14–16. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Simion, M. (2024c). Resistance to Evidence and the Duty to Believe. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 108(1): 203–216.
    Simion, M. (2024d). Resistance to Evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Simion, M., Kelp, C., and Carter, A. (2022). On Behalf of Knowledge-First Collective Epistemology. In Silva, P. and Oliveira, L. (eds.), Doxastic and Propositional Warrant. London: Routledge.
    Sliwa, P. (2017). Moral Understanding as Knowing Right from Wrong. Ethics, 127(3): 521–552.
    Slote, M. (1989). Beyond Optimizing. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
    Sosa, E. (1993). Proper Functionalism and Virtue Epistemology. Nous, 27: 51–65.
    Sosa, E. (2010). Value Matters in Epistemology. Journal of Philosophy, 107: 167–190.
    Sosa, E. (2011). Knowing Full Well. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
    Sosa, E. (2021). Epistemic Explanations: A Theory of Telic Normativity, and What It Explains. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Sperber, D. (2001). An Evolutionary Perspective on Testimony and Argumentation. Philosophical Topics, 29: 401–413.
    Staffel, J. (Forthcoming). Unfinished Business. Rational Attitudes in Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Stanley, J. (2005). Knowledge and Practical Interests. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Stanley, J. and Williamson, T. (2001). Knowing How. The Journal of Philosophy, 98(8): 411–444.
    Sullivan-Bissett, E. (2017). Biological Function and Epistemic Normativity. Philosophical Explorations, 20(1): 94–110.
    Sutton, J. (2005). Stick to What You Know. Noûs, 39: 359–396.
    Tognazzini, N. and Coates, D. J. (2018). Blame. In Zalta, E. N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 Edition). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/blame/.
    Turri, J. (2010). On the Relationship between Propositional and Doxastic Justification. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXXX(2): 312–326.
    Turri, J. (2016). The Point of Assertion Is to Transmit Knowledge. Analysis, 76(2): 130–136.
    Unger, P. (1975). Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Wallace, R. J. (2018). Practical Reason. In Zalta, E. N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 Edition). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/practical-reason/.
    Weiner, M. (2005). Must We Know What We Say? Philosophical Review, 114: 227– 251.
    Weisberg, J. (2013). Knowledge in Action. Philosophers’ Imprint, 13: 1–23.
    Whiting, D. (2013). Stick to the Facts: On the Norms of Assertion. Erkenntnis, 78: 847–867.
    Willard-Kyle, C. (2023). The Knowledge Norm for Inquiry. Journal of Philosophy, 120(11): 615–640.
    Williamson, T. (1996). Knowing and Asserting. Philosophical Review, 105(4): 489–523.
    Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Williamson, T. (2005). Knowledge, Context and the Agent’s Point of View. In Preyer, G. and Peter, G. (eds.), Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning and Truth, 91–114. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Williamson, T. (Forthcoming). Justifications, Excuses, and Sceptical Scenarios. In Dorsch, F. and Dutant, J. (eds.), The New Evil Demon. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Woodard, E. (Forthcoming). Why Double Check? Episteme, 1–24.
    Zimmerman, M. J. (1979). Moral Responsibility and Ignorance. Ethics, 107(3): 410–426.
    Zimmerman, M. (1997). Moral Responsibility and Ignorance. Ethics, CVII(3): 410–426.

    Metrics

    Altmetric attention score

    Full text views

    Total number of HTML views: 0
    Total number of PDF views: 0 *
    Loading metrics...

    Book summary page views

    Total views: 0 *
    Loading metrics...

    * Views captured on Cambridge Core between #date#. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

    Usage data cannot currently be displayed.

    Accessibility standard: Unknown

    Why this information is here

    This section outlines the accessibility features of this content - including support for screen readers, full keyboard navigation and high-contrast display options. This may not be relevant for you.

    Accessibility Information

    Accessibility compliance for the PDF of this book is currently unknown and may be updated in the future.