[Cosmology]

PART <PARS> II

§354. It is not necessary that the finitude of the world, which is yet to be proven, is brought into the definition.

The world is a real whole <totum reale>: all things in it stand in real connection <in nexu reali>.

The world is a whole which is not part of another <totum quod non est pars alterius>: otherwise this would be only a piece of the world.

The world is therefore a (real) whole of actual things, which is not part of another <mundus ergo est totum (reale) actualium, quod non est pars alteriu<.

357. All things are in real connection <in realnexu>: they are connected in certain determinations, be they as they may.

358. (In this world) the world is present, of which I am a part. There is a reciprocal connection, either mediately or immediately <(in hoc mundo) mundus praesens est, cujus sum pars ego. Est nexus mutuus vel mediate vel immediate>.

361. (Cf. §354, as a proposition to be proven, should not be brought into the definition) As parts, all parts of the whole are in real connection <in realnexu> with one another as component parts <compartibus>: because they are grounds of the whole, and the whole cannot subsist without them. A part thus depends on some determinations of the others: consequently no part in the whole is independent – the whole [is] not independent – [but] contingent.

Remarks on metaphysics according to Baumgarten from the lectures of Prof. Kant for <pro> 1794/95

[Introduction]

(I)b Metaphysics belongs to the material part of philosophy, or rather contains that within itself, and therefore, since it presupposes actual objects, rests on laws, i.e., on grounds of cognition (principles <principiis>) of and about that which belongs to the existence of things. From it, therefore, is separated' the merely formal part of philosophy, or the laws of thinking expounded in logic, since the latter abstracts from the objects themselves. It is thereby already distinguished from mathematics, since this rests not, as philosophy, on laws of the cognition of things, but rather on concepts of things made through construction.

Metaphysical cognitions must therefore be cognitions simply of reason, thus arise a priori through pure concepts of reason, i.e., the principles <principia> or grounds of cognition are so constituted that one connects the necessity of what one cognizes with the cognition itself, and the concepts are directed at objects that not only are cognized independently of all experience, but that also can never possibly become an object of experience. E.g., God, freedom, immortality. They differ thus diametrically <e diametro> from all empirical appearances and principles derived therefrom: metaphysics thus has no a posteriori principles <principia>, but rather only a priori: they are given and are cognized through reason alone, but are not made.

(2) Cosmology

CONCEPT OF THE WORLD

Because cosmology borrows its principles not from experience, but rather from pure reason, it can be called rational cosmology. But because even the object as well, and not just the principles, is an object of pure reason and not experience, it is called transcendental cosmology <cosmologia transscendentalis>. In the Ontology we have already spoken of the limiting concepts, which constitute the limit in the series of cognitions. – In relation there were these three concepts: the relation of the substance to the accident; of the cause to the effect, and of the whole to the parts. – In all these cognitions we can think of a first and a last, through which a completeness <completudo> or totality arises in these cognitions. – In the relation of the substance to the accident, the substantial is that which is not an accident of another. – In the relation of the cause to the effect the first cause is the limiting concept, which is no effect of another <causatum alterius>. – In the third relation of the whole to the parts, the limiting concept is the whole which is not a part of another; and that is the concept of the world. This concept is a pure concept of reason, and is not arbitrary, but rather is necessary to human reason. Our reason has a need that is not satisfied until it meets a completeness <completudinem> in the series of things, or until it can think a complete totality.

Introduction [Logic]

ON PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL

All human cognitions are, according to form, of a twofold kind: (i) historical, which are from things given <ex datis>, taken merely from experience; and (2) rational cognitions, which are from principles <exprincipiis>, taken from certain principles. The rational cognitions are again: (1) philosophical, cognitions from concepts, and (2) mathematical, from the construction of concepts. One can distinguish cognitions according to their objective origin, i.e., according to the sources from which alone a cognition is possible; and according to the subjective origin, i.e., according to the manner in which cognition can be acquired by a human being. With respect to the former, cognitions are either rational or empirical, with respect to the latter, rational or historical; in itself the cognition may have come about however it will. – The system of rational cognition through concepts would thus be philosophy. But first we must consider the cognitions themselves, and then the system of them. – Because mathematics and philosophy agree in that they are rational cognitions, we must first define rational cognitions. The rational cognitions are opposed to the historical ones. The historical ones are derived from things given <ex datis>, and the rational cognitions from principles <ex principiis>, as we have already indicated above. The first, namely, the historical, are cognitions which are possible only insofar as they are given.

Metaphysics lectures of Prof Kant written in the years 1784 and 85 by I. W. Volckmann

[Rational psychology]

wanted to annihilate. However, both presuppose this: that we have a soul, therefore one could insert another idea here, namely: that we have no soul at all, and yet will live after death, this idea considers life only as property of the body, and so even the materialist can hope for a future life. In England, Priestley maintained this. One cannot demonstrate, however, the complete impossibility of the transitoriness of the soul, but rather only the impossibility of its passing away like a body. With this there is to prove (1) its perdurability, i.e., the survival of the substance, (2) its survival as intelligence, i.e., of a being whose faculty of reason and its acts <actus> also survive, (3) the actual survival of the personality of the human soul, that after death it be conscious of itself that it was the same soul, for otherwise I could not say that it itself exists in the future world, but rather that there would be another rational being there. – One can infer the immortality of the soul either from empirical or pure rational psychology, from the empirical one would have to do it in this manner: that from the experiences which we have of the soul, its survival followed; but this is not feasible, for from all perceptions of it in interaction <commercio> with the body we cannot infer how it would be constituted outside the interaction <commercio> with the body we would then have to have a faculty for positing our soul outside the interaction <commercio> with the body, or we would have to observe other souls (e.g., if there were ghosts), neither of which is feasible.

Metaphysics according to the lectures of Professor Kant in the winter semester 1792/93 from 7—8. by H. L. A. Dohna, begun Monday the 15th October 1792 (compendium by Baumgarten)

SPECIAL METAPHYSICS […]

The objects of our ideas are world and God – thus cosmology and theology The first concerns objects of the senses – (e.g., objects of nature, insofar as they constitute an absolute whole) but now also only insofar as they are not objects of the senses. Objects of the senses are:

1. of outer sense, these concern body, thus somatology, but only insofar as this cognition is unconditioned does it belong to the transcendental.

2. Of inner sense, this concerns the soul. We can think an immanent doctrine of body and of soul, a somatology and empirical psychology, [and] in order to indicate the connection of these empirical sciences with the rational ones, we want to mention something of them in the following. We divide metaphysics into:

1. critique of pure reason and ontology {contains immanent and transcendental concepts};

2. into the transcendent part of philosophy, now this is the one which contains cosmology and natural theology. – With respect to the transcendent our cognition is dialectical, I can affirm and deny a proposition with equally good grounds, maintain and refute it. This is a peculiar phenomenon of reason, it is called antinomy {conflict in its own subjective laws}. Thus we now go to the first section of this second part.

Rational psychology

<Psychologia rationalis>

teaches the nature of the human soul. Soul is the subject of sensation. In German it always indicates something inner, as e.g., the soul of a feather, a canon, i.e., the line drawn through the center of the mouth to the center of the ground. Mind <psyche> means butterfly <papillori>. Thus in this naming of the soul there lies an analogy with a butterfly, which is hidden preformed in the caterpillar, which is nothing more than its husk. This teaches that in this world dying is nothing more than regeneration. Soul <anima> is the animating principle in an animal. Matter cannot live for itself. This is a proposition against hylozoism. If one assumes that matter as matter thinks, lives, i.e., acts according to representations, then this is above all contrary to physics; that parts of matter are not moved by others, but rather can move themselves, contradicts the principle of inertia. Pythagoras says something mystical: the soul is a number moving itself <numerus se ipsum movens>. Soul <anima> is the sensible, mind <animus> the intellectual faculty of the soul. Mind <mens, nous> is this in any event. – Soul and spirit are to be sure two distinct relations but only two faculties of one and the same subject.

A living being has only one soul, this is a principle in psychology. The consciousness of the unity of my soul follows already from the conscious-ness of my subject.

Within a few years of the publication of his Critique of Pure Reason in 1781, Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) was recognized by his contemporaries as one of the seminal philosophers of modern times – indeed as one of the great philosophers of all time. This renown soon spread beyond Germanspeaking lands, and translations of Kant's work into English were published even before 1800. Since then, interpretations of Kant's views have come and gone and loyalty to his positions has waxed and waned, but his importance has not diminished. Generations of scholars have devoted their efforts to producing reliable translations of Kant into English as well as into other languages.

There are four main reasons for the present edition of Kant's writings:

1. Completeness. Although most of the works published in Kant's lifetime have been translated before, the most important ones more than once, only fragments of Kant's many important unpublished works have ever been translated. These include the Opus postumum, Kant's unfinished magnum opus on the transition from philosophy to physics; transcriptions of his classroom lectures; his correspondence; and his marginalia and other notes. One aim of this edition is to make a comprehensive sampling of these materials available in English for the first time.

2. Availability. Many English translations of Kant's works, especially those that have not individually played a large role in the subsequent development of philosophy, have long been inaccessible or out of print.

PRELIMINARY OVERVIEW

Kant was eloquent about the centrality of metaphysics in his view of philosophy: “Metaphysics is the spirit of philosophy. It is related to philosophy as the spirit of wine [spiritus vini] is to wine. It purifies our elementary concepts and thereby makes us capable of comprehending all sciences. In short, it is the greatest culture of the human understanding” (Ak. 29: 940).

These words are from the end of the Metaphysik Mrongovius, perhaps the most significant of the sets of student notes from Kant's lectures that are being translated here for the first time. Given the importance of metaphysics in Kant's system, it must seem remarkable that it has taken so long for his lectures on metaphysics to see the full light of day. Although notes from his lectures were widely used and distributed during his lifetime, only parts of two sets of lectures on metaphysics were published (by Pölitz) in the first half century after Kant's death. Parts of a few other sets were reproduced by other editors within the next hundred years, and in the 1920s philosophers such as Heinz Heimsoeth and Martin Heidegger made a strong case that Kant's traditional metaphysical concerns remained central even throughout his Critical period. Nonetheless, it was not until 1968 and 1970 that versions of these lectures appeared in the Academy edition of Kant's works, and they were seldom cited by scholars, let alone reviewed or discussed at length.