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Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
April 2025
Print publication year:
2025
Online ISBN:
9781009233897
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009233897
Creative Commons:
Creative Common License - CC Creative Common License - BY Creative Common License - NC
This content is Open Access and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence CC-BY-NC 4.0 https://creativecommons.org/creativelicenses
Series:
Elements in Philosophy and Logic
Subjects:
Logic, Philosophy
Information

Book description

This Element delves into the relationship between logic and the sciences, a topic brought to prominence by Quine, who regarded logic as methodologically and epistemologically akin to the sciences. For this reason, Quine is seen as the forefather of anti-exceptionalism about logic (AEL), a stance that has become prevalent in the philosophy of logic today. Despite its popularity and the volume of research it inspires, some core issues still lack clarity. For one thing, most works in the debate remain vague on what should count as logic and what should count as a science. Furthermore, the terms of the comparison are rarely specified and discussed in a systematic way. This Element purports to advance the debate on these crucial issues with the hope of fostering our understanding of the fundamentals of AEL. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

References

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