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  • Cited by 13
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    • Publisher:
      Cambridge University Press
      Publication date:
      27 April 2023
      25 May 2023
      ISBN:
      9781009039154
      9781009017664
      DOI:
      https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009039154
      Dimensions:
      Weight & Pages:
      Dimensions:
      (229 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.15kg, 88 Pages
      • Subjects:
      Mathematics (general), Philosophy: General Interest, Philosophy of Science, Philosophy
      Series:
      Elements in the Philosophy of Mathematics
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    Subjects:
    Mathematics (general), Philosophy: General Interest, Philosophy of Science, Philosophy
    Series:
    Elements in the Philosophy of Mathematics
    Information

    Book description

    This Element answers four questions. Can any traditional theory of scientific explanation make sense of the place of mathematics in explanation? If traditional monist theories are inadequate, is there some way to develop a more flexible, but still monist, approach that will clarify how mathematics can help to explain? What sort of pluralism about explanation is best equipped to clarify how mathematics can help to explain in science and in mathematics itself? Finally, how can the mathematical elements of an explanation be integrated into the physical world? Some of the evidence for a novel scientific posit may be traced to the explanatory power that this posit would afford, were it to exist. Can a similar kind of explanatory evidence be provided for the existence of mathematical objects, and if not, why not?

    Reviews

    ‘[T]his book’s survey of positions and arguments will be of use to those familiar with the debate over the role of mathematics in explanation, who are looking for guidance on becoming experts.’

    Bradford Skow Source: Metascience

    References

    References

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