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    • Publisher:
      Cambridge University Press
      Publication date:
      19 September 2022
      13 October 2022
      ISBN:
      9781108754750
      9781108718950
      DOI:
      https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108754750
      Creative Commons:
      Creative Common License - CC Creative Common License - BY
      This content is Open Access and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence CC-BY 4.0.
      https://creativecommons.org/creativelicenses
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      Weight & Pages:
      Dimensions:
      (229 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.16kg, 102 Pages
      • Subjects:
      Philosophy of Science, Philosophy
      Series:
      Elements in Decision Theory and Philosophy
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    Subjects:
    Philosophy of Science, Philosophy
    Series:
    Elements in Decision Theory and Philosophy
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    Book description

    Suppose that you prefer A to B, B to C, and C to A. Your preferences violate Expected Utility Theory by being cyclic. Money-pump arguments offer a way to show that such violations are irrational. Suppose that you start with A. Then you should be willing to trade A for C and then C for B. But then, once you have B, you are offered a trade back to A for a small cost. Since you prefer A to B, you pay the small sum to trade from B to A. But now you have been turned into a money pump. You are back to the alternative you started with but with less money. This Element shows how each of the axioms of Expected Utility Theory can be defended by money-pump arguments of this kind. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

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