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  • Cited by 11
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
January 2024
Print publication year:
2024
Online ISBN:
9781009052337
Series:
Elements in the Philosophy of Mathematics

Book description

This Element, written for researchers and students in philosophy and the behavioral sciences, reviews and critically assesses extant work on number concepts in developmental psychology and cognitive science. It has four main aims. First, it characterizes the core commitments of mainstream number cognition research, including the commitment to representationalism, the hypothesis that there exist certain number-specific cognitive systems, and the key milestones in the development of number cognition. Second, it provides a taxonomy of influential views within mainstream number cognition research, along with the central challenges these views face. Third, it identifies and critically assesses a series of core philosophical assumptions often adopted by number cognition researchers. Finally, the Element articulates and defends a novel version of pluralism about number concepts.

Reviews

‘This book is worth reading because of the variety of topics covered, the interdisciplinary approach, and the relevance of the issues. It can be highly recommended to philosophers, psychologists, cognitivists and mathematicians who are at different stages of their scientific careers.’

Karolina Tytko Source: Metascience

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