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    • Publisher:
      Cambridge University Press
      Publication date:
      06 November 2020
      03 December 2020
      ISBN:
      9781108686990
      9781108711845
      DOI:
      https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108686990
      Dimensions:
      Weight & Pages:
      Dimensions:
      (229 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.1kg, 86 Pages
      • Subjects:
      Philosophy of Religion, Philosophy: General Interest, Religion
      Series:
      Elements in the Philosophy of Religion
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    Subjects:
    Philosophy of Religion, Philosophy: General Interest, Religion
    Series:
    Elements in the Philosophy of Religion
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    Book description

    Proving the existence of God is a perennial philosophical ambition. An armchair proof would be the jackpot. Ontological arguments promise as much. This Element studies the most famous ontological arguments from Anselm, Descartes, Plantinga, and others besides. While the verdict is that ontological arguments don't work, they get us entangled in fun philosophical puzzles, from philosophy of religion to philosophy of language, from metaphysics to ethics, and beyond.

    References

    References

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